The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person\u27s Access to Justice by Vargo, John F.
THE AMERICAN RULE ON ATTORNEY
FEE ALLOCATION: THE INJURED
PERSON'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE
JOHN F. VARGO*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................ 1568
I. Development of the American Rule and Its Exceptions. 1570
A. The English Background ........................... 1570
B. Colonial America .................................. 1571
C. Development of the American Rule ................ 1575
D. Exceptions to the Rule ............................. 1578
1. Contracts ...................................... 1578
2. Common fund ................................. 1579
3. Substantial benefit doctrine ..................... 1581
4. Contempt ...................................... 1583
5. Bad faith ....................................... 1584
6. Statutes and rules of procedure ................. 1587
a. One-way shift ............................... 1589
b. Two-way shift ............................... 1590
II. Arguments Against the American Rule ................. 1590
A. Court Congestion and Colorable Claims ........... 1591
B. Compensation ..................................... 1591
C. Small Claim s ...................................... 1592
III. The Forgotten Framework of Fee-Shifting Rules:
Access to Justice ...................................... 1593
A. Risk Aversion ...................................... 1593
B. Access to Justice ................................... 1594
1. Costs .......................................... 1595
2. Parties' capabilities ............................. 1596
* Partner, Pardieck, Gill & Vargo, Indianapolis, Indiana; Adjunct Professor of Law,
Bond University School of Law, Queensland, Australia. J.D. Indiana University School of
Law, Indianapolis. Author of more than 30 articles. Editor-in-chief of five-volume treatise
entitled Products Liability Practice Guide, published by Matthew Bender.
1567
1568 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1567
IV. A New Look at the English Rule: Its Application and
Effects ................................................. 1597
A. Comparative Law .................................. 1597
B. England ........................................... 1601
1. Hard bargaining ................................ 1603
a. The parties ................................. 1604
b. Preparation ................................. 1605
c. Legal costs .................................. 1606
d. Solicitor/client .............................. 1606
e. Party/party ................................. 1606
2. Financing ...................................... 1606
a. Private ...................................... 1607
b. Legal aid ................................... 1607
c. Trade union ................................ 1608
3. Bargaining ..................................... 1609
4. Paym ent in ..................................... 1611
5. Conclusion ..................................... 1612
C. Australia ........................................... 1613
1. Sm all claim s .................................... 1613
2. Indigent plaintiffs .............................. 1615
3. M iddle class .................................... 1616
V. The American Practice and Theory .................... 1617
A. Contingent Fee System ............................ 1617
B. Recent Studies ..................................... 1619
C. Alaska ............................................. 1622
D. Econom ics ......................................... 1626
E. The One-Way Shift ................................ 1629
VI. A Reexamination of the Arguments Against the
American Rule ........................................ 1630
A. Compensation ..................................... 1630
B. Small Claims ...................................... 1630
C. Court Congestion .................................. 1631
D. Severely Injured Indigents ......................... 1633
VII. The Rationale for the American Rule: Access to Justice 1634
Conclusion ................................................. 1635
INTRODUCTION
William Hughes died following gall bladder surgery.' Pauline
Hughes, William's widow, brought an action against his treating
1. Tim Cornwall, 'Double or Quits. Quayle Lihes the 'English Rule' but Brits Have Their
Doubts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1.
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physicians.2 When the trial judge awarded Pauline $396,000, the
physicians appealed.3 The physicians based the appeal solely on the
merits of the medical negligence action; they did not allege that the
plaintiff or her counsel had acted in an abusive manner.4 The appel-
late court overturned Mrs. Hughes' award and ordered her to pay
the physicians' legal bill of $144,000. 5 Mrs. Hughes owed her own
legal representatives $146,000.6 Thus, after the appeal, she owed a
total of $290,000 for legal fees.7
Most people, especially attorneys, would be shocked by such an
event. A contingent fee contract normally relieves a plaintiff like
Mrs. Hughes of liability for her own attorney's fees in the event of a
loss. Why did she have to pay the physicians' attorney's fees? How
could this happen in the absence of bad faith or abusive conduct?
There is a very good reason why Mrs. Hughes not only lost her
$396,000 award but also was obligated to pay $290,000 in legal fees:
she lives in London, England.8
In the English legal system, a "loser pays" rule applies.9 The suc-
cessful litigant can collect his or her legal fees, or costs, from the
loser.' 0 In the United States, the losing party does not generally pay
the winner's legal fees. 1 Each party is only obligated to pay his or
her own attorney's fees, regardless of the outcome of the litiga-
tion.12 This practice is called the "American Rule";13 the practice
that allows shifting of legal fees is called the "English Rule." 14
Most of the numerous articles examining fee-shifting rules are
based on theory or conjecture.1 5 This Article will go beyond theory
2. Id
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id.
7. Id at 13. After public outcry and intervention by Mrs. Hughes' local member of
Parliament, the lawyers reduced the total bill to $216,000. Id.
8. See id at I (stating that English Rule requires losing party to pay prevailing party's
attorney's fees).
9. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The English Rule, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54, 55 (describing
English Rule, which requires loser of lawsuit to pay winner's legal fees, and discussing use of
such rule in United States).
10. Id
11. See I MARY F. DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WoLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES,
1.02[l], at 109 (1992) (defining this practice as American Rule).
12. Id
13. Id
14. Kritzer, supra note 9, at 55.
15. See, e.g., Leonard R. Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 13 CAL. ST. B.J. 42, 43 (1938)
(proposing model attorney's fee statute and providing justification for it); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 794-800
(1966) [hereinafter Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement] (arguing that administration ofjustice requires
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing party); Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE LJ. 849, 851-
78 (1929) (providing lengthy discussion of history of attorney's fees award in England and
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and examine two rather unexplored factors: the practices of attor-
neys and solicitors, and the results of a few recent empirical studies.
These factors require some revision of past assumptions about the
attributes of the English Rule. This Article focuses on a comparison
of the two rules in the context of personal injury suits. Most of the
analysis, however, will also apply to other types of actions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. The English Background
Early English courts of equity allowed the Chancellor to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party; the Chancellor, however,
rarely granted fee awards unless the losing party acted in an abusive
manner. 16 At common law, fee awards were based solely on stat-
utes. 17 In 1278, the Statutes of Gloucester allowed only the victori-
ous plaintiff to recover attorney's fees in specified actions.' 8 Not
until two centuries later could a defendant recover attorney's fees,
brief discussion of American Rule); Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps Are an Incomplete
Refonn: A Proposal for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 782-800 (1989)
(proposing attorney fee shifting as means of reforming tort litigation); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75, 75-86 (1963) (suggesting that
attorney's fees awards can alleviate congested courts and provide complete remedy to prevail-
ing party); PhilipJ. Mause, Winner Takes Alk A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L.
REV. 26, 28-50 (1969) (reviewing advantages and disadvantages of awarding attorney's fees
and suggesting that indemnity based on "reasonableness" of loser's position is appropriate);
Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REV. 619, 622-43 (1931) (discussing collection of attorney's fees and arguing for
reform of American system); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 139, 140-70 (describing effects of shifting attorney's
fees); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting A Critical Overview, 1982
DUKE LJ. 651, 652-78 [hereinafter Rowe, Legal Theory] (critiquing various rationales and im-
plications of attorney fee shifting); Thomas E. Shea, Closing Pandora 's Box: Litigation Economics,
22 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 276-88 (1986) (defending legal awards for litigation costs and interest
on such costs); Kenneth W. Starr, The Shifting Panorama of Attorneys'Fees Awards: The Expansion
of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S. Txx. L. REV. 189, 195-230 (1986) (discussing advantages
and disadvantages of fee-shifting statutes); William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs:
A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 202, 211-18 (1966) (suggesting statutory reform
that would provide attorney's fees to prevailing party); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees
and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 637-55 (1974) [hereinafter Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees] (arguing that legislative reform of American Rule is required);
Jon S. Hoak, Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DAKE L. REV. 717, 717-37
(1976) (discussing statutory, judicially created, and contractual exceptions to American Rule);
Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal
Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 149-72 (1981) (discussing impact of American Rule on legal access
and examining proposed reform to attorney fee system); see also infra note 491 (citing number
of authorities that discuss economic aspects of fee shifting).
16. See Monroe, supra note 15, at 150 (stating that although Chancellor could award at-
torney's fees where circumstances warranted them, such recovery was limited to instances of
abuse of process).
17. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 851-54 (discussing statutory basis for common law
rule regarding costs and examining rights and limitations created by statute;).
18. Statutes of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. I (Eng.) (awarding plaintiff costs for cer-
tain actions in land).
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and then only in isolated instances.19 By 1607, a defendant could
recover fees on the same basis as a winning plaintiff.20 In 1875, the
Rules of Court gave English courts the discretion to determine the
amounts that could be awarded to a prevailing litigant.21 In modem
practice, however, the English courts have developed an elaborate
system of taxing costs. 22 Under this system, the solicitor represent-
ing the winning party prepares a bill of costs, detailing each item of
taxable expense.23 If the losing party agrees, it pays the bill; parties,
however, rarely agree.24 When disputed, the parties present their
itemized expenses to a taxing master who decides the appropriate
amounts after a hearing.25
B. Colonial America
The law concerning attorney fee shifting as it developed in Eng-
land was a creature of statute.26 Absent enabling legislation, the
English Rule would mirror the American Rule where the "loser" is
not responsible for the attorney's fees of the "winner." Thus, the
practice in both England and America reflects simple adherence to
legislative commands. If colonial America had followed the English
fee-shifting practice, the evidence of such a practice would be found
in colonial statutes.
Almost all colonial legislation regarding attorney's fees reflect an
intent to control the amount an attorney could charge the client
rather than an intent to shift attorney's fees as costs to be collected
by the prevailing litigant.27 Several seventeenth-century colonial
statutes that either totally denied attorney's fees for services or de-
nied paid attorneys access to the courts reflect this desire to control
the amount of attorney's fees.28 This antagonism toward attorneys
appears to result from the suspicion and jealousy of the ruling class:
19. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 853 (stating that in 1531 defendant was given attor-
ney's fees in certain actions such as trespass and contract).
20. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 853.
21. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 854 (discussing Order 55 of Rules of Court that per-
mitted award of attorney's fees).
22. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 855 (describing taxing scheme that included valida-
tion of costs and right to appeal costs award).
23. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 855.
24. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 855.
25. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 855.
26. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 851 (discussing statutory basis for English Rule); Mc-
Cormick, supra note 15, at 619-21 (discussing origin of English Rule).
27. SeeJohn Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 10-11 (noting that colonial legislation limited amount of
attorney's fees, and that litigants expected losing party to pay attorney's fees of prevailing
party).
28. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1913).
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In every one of the Colonies, practically throughout the Seven-
teenth Century, a lawyer or attorney was a character of disrepute
and of suspicion, of whose standing or power in the community
the ruling class, where it was the clergy as in New England, or the
merchants as in New York, Maryland and Virginia, or the Quakers
as in Pennsylvania, was extremely jealous. In many of the Colo-
nies, persons acting as attorneys were forbidden to receive any
fee; in some, all paid attorneys were barred from the court; in all,
they were subjected to the most rigid restrictions as to fees and
procedure.29
During this period, the colonial population believed that the law
encompassed fairly simple rules that could be understood easily by
most intelligent people.30 Manyjudges were laymen, and the public
viewed attorneys as unnecessary luxuries.3 1 As time progressed, at-
torneys gained greater respect.32 By the turn of the eighteenth cen-
tury, it became common practice to employ an attorney.3 3 During
this time, the colonies developed many attorney fee and cost regula-
tions.3 4 These statutes regulated both the fees an attorney could
charge clients and the amount of attorney's fees that could be as-
sessed as costs to the losing party.3 5
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, and North
Carolina set attorney-client fees and cost recovery fees at the same
level.3 6 Other colonies established fee schedules, but made no ref-
erence to the amount of attorney's fees recoverable as part of the
cost awards in litigation.3 7 Professor Leubsdorf assumes that once
statutes set attorney's fees, this same amount could be recovered
from a defeated opponent.38
In 1694, South Carolina's fee schedule allowed a plaintiff's attor-
ney to receive sixteen shillings for services up to and including the
filing of the declaration.3 9 In 1745, Virginia prescribed the amount
that could be taxed as costs to the defeated adversary in a county
29. Id.
30. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 873 (stating that population regarded law not as sci-
entific specialty, but as body of clearly stated rules available to all).
31. See Goodhart, supra note 15, at 873 (stating that lawyers were viewed as unnecessary
because law was meant to be intelligible to all people).
32. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 873.
33. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 873.
34. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10 (noting that virtually all colonies regulated attor-
neys during this period).
35. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10 (stating that to be effective, regulations on attor-
ney's fees had to limit both fees that attorneys could charge and fees recoverable from losing
parties in lawsuits).
36. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10 n.8.
37. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10.
38. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10 n.8.
39. McCormick, supra note 15, at 620 n.7.
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court as fifteen shillings or 150 pounds of tobacco. 40 By the 1790s,
several new states had set attorney fee schedules for various prac-
tices.4 1 For example, Delaware established that an attorney could
receive $.01 per twelve-word line, $.40 for a writ, and $1.00 for an
appeal from Orphan's Court;42 New Jersey allowed $.70 per plead-
ing and created a $2.00 maximum for trying a case;43 and Penn-
sylvania limited fees to a $4.00 maximum for trials and $1.67 for
settlements when suit had been filed. 44 Although the colonies' strict
control of fees is sometimes attributed to a general distrust of attor-
neys, 45 colonial legislatures commonly regulated many aspects of
the economy.46 It is unclear whether these colonial fee schedules
were intended initially to establish maximum compensation levels
for attorneys or whether attorneys could charge more than the set
amounts. 47
The fee schedules soon became insufficient recompense for attor-
neys due to inflation and state legislatures' failure to update the
amounts. 48 Naturally, attorneys attempted to circumvent the re-
strictions and freely market their services. 49 Thus, at an early stage
in American history, legislative control of attorney's fees clashed
with the bars' desire for adequate compensation.50 Professor Leub-
sdorf believes that the resolution of this conflict led to the creation
of the American Rule.5'
By the beginning of the new Union, it is fairly evident that the new
40. McCormick, supra note 15, at 620.
41. See 2 ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 254-58 (1965)
(discussing legislative limits on attorney's fees enacted during 1790s).
42. Id. at 256.
43. Id. at 255.
44. Id. at 257.
45. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (describing early antagonism toward
lawyers in colonial America).
46. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 11 (noting that commentators usually ascribe such
legislation to antilawyer hostility as shown by attempts to ban lawyers entirely, but noting that
many parts of colonial economy were regulated and attorney fee regulation was therefore not
necessarily due to lawyer hostility).
47. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 11-12 (noting that attorneys occasionally collected
fees for practices not regulated by fee schedules); see also supra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text (noting that fee schedules regulated attorney's fees for specific practices).
48. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 13-14; see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at
799 (noting that in 1848, New York Legislature fixed amount of attorney's fees in dollars and
cents instead of as percentage of amount recovered or claimed); McCormick, supra note 15, at
620 n.7 (stating that statute awarding attorneys 15 shillings in 1745 was still followed 75 years
later).
49. Cf Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 11-12 (illustrating how lawyers collected fees or
"gifts" for charges not mentioned in regulations and charged clients more than court would
award as costs from losing opponent).
50. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 13.
51. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 16-17 (concluding that American Rule evolved as
compromise that permitted lawyers to charge clients high rates while legislatures could con-
tinue to restrict cost recovery from losing parties).
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states had adopted a type of fee shifting that benefited the litigation
winner.52 This development could lead one to assume that colonial
America adopted the so-called English Rule; this assumption, how-
ever, is not exactly accurate. In fact, colonial America did not adopt
the meticulous fee-shifting procedure developed in England.5 3 The
English procedure had created a bifurcated taxation system that dis-
tinguished the fees that could be charged to a client from those that
could be taxed as costs to the losing party.54 In the English system,
however, custom, and not statute, set the level of charges for both
attorney-client fees and fees paid by losing parties.55 Consequently,
the prevailing attorney generally recovered less than the fee that
could be obtained from his own client.56 In general principle, there-
fore, the rules adopted by the colonies did not deviate from the
English fee-shifting procedure: in both England and the United
States, statutes provided the basis for attorney fee shifting. What
has been called the American Rule is, in effect, the rule established
in England.
The distinction between the English Rule and the American Rule
thus encompasses not the statutory basis for the fee-shifting mecha-
nism but the level of compensation that the prevailing party can col-
lect from the losing party. What has practically occurred in the
United States is that the statutes that set the amount of recoverable
costs by the victorious litigant have remained at nominal amounts. 57
The fact that recoverable attorney's fees are nominal is merely a dif-
ference of degree, not kind. Courts have followed the statutes re-
gardless of the size of fees allowed 58 and have given fairly consistent
52. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 10-12 (stating that while awards of attorney's fees to
prevailing parties were presumed, such awards were regulated).
53. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 12-13 (stating that colonial America did not adopt
English system of fee shifting, perhaps because customs and professional and procedural
mechanisms linked to English system were not imported to colonies).
54. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 12 (stating that fees chargeable to clients were not
necessarily taxable at same level as fees collected from opponents).
55. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 12.
56. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 12.
57. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 17-24 (discussing various statutes that kept attorney's
fee recoveries at low levels and that led lawyers to demand to be able to charge clients what
market could bear).
58. Two examples indicate what can occur when courts follow statutes regardless of size
of fees allowed. First is the Alaska exception where substantial fees have been allowed to the
winning party since 1900. ALAsKA STAT. § 90.60.010 (1992) (granting Alaska Supreme Court
authority to determine costs to be awarded to prevailing party); ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 54(d) (re-
quiring award of costs to prevailing party except when forbidden by statute, rule, or court);
ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(a) (regulating attorney's fee awards, including fee schedule and proce-
dural requirements); see Gregory S. Hughes, Note, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis
of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-A.AsA L. REv. 129, 143-78 (1974) (discussing Alaska statute providing
attorney's fees to prevailing party and suggesting compromise where attorney's fees would be
awarded in predetermined cases). The second example is a Florida statute that adopted a
[Vol. 42:1567
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treatment to the recovery of attorney's fees in litigation.
C. Development of the American Rule
The American Rule took root in colonial America and matured
during the nineteenth century.59 During that century, attorneys
freed themselves from legislative constraints on fees. 60 In keeping
with the dominant laissez-faire attitude, American attorneys asserted
the freedom to contract with clients for legal services. 61 The free
marketing of legal services outside of legislative fee schedules had a
great impact on the establishment of the American Rule.62 Unfet-
tered attorney-client fee contracts, however, cannot fully explain the
rule's creation. Attorney's fees as a collectable cost from a defeated
opponent are also an essential factor in completing the equation.
Legal precedent does not fully explain why attorney's fees as taxable
costs did not keep pace with the amounts collectable as attorney-
client fees.
In 1789, Congress enacted legislation that authorized federal
courts to follow state law concerning attorney's fee awards. 63 This
1789 Act was followed by a fee bill for admiralty cases in 1793.64 In
1796, the Supreme Court set forth the American Rule in Arcambel v.
Wiseman. 65 In Arcambel, a case in admiralty, the plaintiff received
damages and an award of $1600 for attorney's fees.66 The Court
struck the attorney's fees from the judgment by remittitur, stating in
part:
mandatory two-way fee shift during the period between 1980 and 1985. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.56 (West 1983) (repealed 1985) (authorizing award of attorney's fees in medical mal-
practice litigation); see Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating
Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6J.L., ECON. & ORG. 345, 355-78 (1990) (providing em-
pirical analysis of Florida's fee-shifting rule for medical malpractice litigation for period June
1980 to September 1985). The effects of the Alaska and Florida fee-shifting statutes are dis-
cussed below. See infra notes 435-449 and accompanying text (reviewing Florida statute); infra
notes 450-89 and accompanying text (reviewing Alaska statute). There have been several
thousand fee statutes in both federal and state courts. See 3 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11,
Table of Statutes, TS-1 to TS-36 (listing nearly 200 federal statutes that provide for attorney's
fees); Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, LAw &
CoNrrEMp. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321, 328-45 [hereinafter Note, Fee Shifting Statutes] (listing
almost 2000 state statutes).
59. See supra notes 27-56 (describing development of American Rule in colonial
America).
60. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 13-17 (discussing recognition of right of lawyers to
collect fees greater than those provided for by statute).
61. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 18.
62. See Leubsdorf supra note 27, at 13 (noting that lawyers did not challenge cost recov-
ery but did challenge what fees they could charge their own clients and their ability to market
services freely).
63. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (repealed 1792).
64. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 332, 332 (expired 1798).
65. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
66. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796).
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We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed. The general
practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the
respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.6 7
The Court did not explain its reference in Arcambel to the practice in
effect in 1796. It is clear that fees could be awarded under either
the 1789 or 1793 legislation.68 Thus, the Court could have disal-
lowed only the fees in excess of the amount allowed under the stat-
utes. Alternatively, if the $1600 attorney's fees constituted part of
the damages, the Court may have rejected them on that basis.
Whatever reason motivated the Court's decision, it is clear that this
practice had developed either in colonial times or during the first
few years of the Union.
The 1789 Act, its supporting legislation, and all other statutes
that allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees expired by 1800.69
Between 1800 and 1853, no federal statute authorized an award of
attorney's fees. 70 During this period, the federal courts "borrowed"
state law concerning fee awards. 71 In certain cases such as admiralty
or patents where state law did not apply, the federal courts dealt
inconsistently with fee awards. 72 The federal courts vacillated as to
whether attorney's fees should be allowed as costs or as part of the
damage award.73
In The Apollon,74 the U.S. Supreme Court held that attorney's fees
could be awarded in admiralty cases and could be given "either in
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing 1789 and 1793 statutes).
69. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 248 n.19 (1975)
(stating that statutes expired by 1799 and providing survey of 1789 Act).
70. Id. Congress did enact legislation in 1842 that allowed the Supreme Court to set
taxable costs and attorney's fees; however, the Court never acted on this legislation. Act of
Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (repealed 1853); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 249.
71. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 250 (noting that federal courts relied on appropriate state
statutes even after legislative authorization for practice expired).
72. Compare Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (holding that attor-
ney's fees are contrary to general practice) and Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,
372-73 (1851) (holding thatjury may not award attorney's fees) with Boston Mlfg. Co. v. Fiske,
3 F. Cas. 957, 958 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (presenting Justice Story's criticism of,'reambel opin-
ion and stating that Arcambel was inconsistent with practice in admiralty courts). Justice
Story's viewpoint may be the reason for the decisions in both The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362 (1824), and Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830). See infra notes 74-83
and accompanying text (discussing distinction between holdings in The Apollon, where Court
permitted attorney's fees based on statutory authority, and in Canter, where Court allowed
imposition of fees despite lack of statutory basis); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 15
nn.39-41 (referring to other early cases that take contrasting views on issue of attorney's
fees).
73. Compare The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 379 (holding that attorney's fees could be
awarded as damages or as costs) with Moodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 372-73 (holding that
attorney's fees could not be awarded as damages).
74. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
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the shape of damages, or as part of the costs." 75 The Court in The
Apollon made no reference to Arcambel and stated that fees could be
awarded at the sound discretion of the court.76 The Court's deci-
sion in The Apollon, however, was short lived. In 1851, the Court in
Day v. Woodworth77 held that a jury could not include attorney's fees
as part of a damage award.78 According to Woodworth, a court could
only award attorney's fees to the winning party as allowed by a "bor-
rowed" state statute.79 This holding was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's 1830 decision in Canter v. American Insurance Co.,80
which allowed attorney's fees despite a lack of relevant statutory au-
thority.8 ' In Canter, the Court stated that the law did not limit the
power to award such fees, but that this authority remained within a
court's discretionary powers inherited from the English Courts of
Chancery.8 2 After the adoption of the 1853 fee bill, Canter was "in
effect" overruled.8 3
Between 1800 and 1853, the multitude of state laws concerning
costs and attorney's fees and the federal courts' inconsistent ap-
proach to such awards led to many inequities.8 4 In 1853, Senator
Bradbury voiced one of the major complaints about the fee-shifting
system:
The abuses that have grown up in the taxation of attorneys' fees
which the losing party has been compelled to pay in civil suits,
have been a matter of serious complaint. The papers before the
committee show that in some cases those costs have been swelled
to an amount exceedingly oppressive to suitors, and altogether
disproportionate to the magnitude and importance of the causes
in which they are taxed, or the labor bestowed.85
75. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 379 (1824).
76. Id.
77. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
78. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372-73 (1851) (holding that jury lacks
discretion to award attorney's fees by noting that it would be unfair to allow plaintiff, but not
defendant, to recover attorney's fees).
79. Id.
80. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830).
81. Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 319 (1830).
82. Id.
83. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920,
1923(a) (1988)); see The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392-93 (1869) (holding that 1853
Act does not permit attorney's fees and that cases allowing attorney's fees were decided prior
to Act).
84. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 251-52 (1975) (dis-
cussing lack of uniformity in awarding attorney's fees during this period and need for unifying
legislation); see also supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (describing sources of discrepan-
cies in federal courts regarding recovery of attorney's fees).
85. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1853), quoted in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 252 n.24.
Senator Bradbury's remarks include several complaints about attorney's fees as they existed in
1853 and before. CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 207.
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Congress enacted the 1853 fee bill86 to overcome the "unequal,
extravagant, and often oppressive system. '87 The Act permits the
collection of docket fees ranging from five to twenty dollars,88 but it
does not allow the collection of any other compensation. 9 The
1853 fee bill has not been repealed or modified to this clay.90 Thus,
absent either statutory or judicial exception, the winning party in
litigation can recover only the twenty-dollar docket fee.91
D. Exceptions to the Rule
1. Contracts
A contract may provide for the shifting of attorney's fees should
litigation arise from a dispute over it. Courts recognize such agree-
ments as an exception to the American Rule.92 This exception first
arose during the nineteenth century when the laissez-faire doctrine
dominated. 93 Typical contractual agreements that incorporate fee-
shifting provisions include promissory notes,94 bills of sale,95 mort-
gage instruments, 96 and insurance contracts. 97 Most fee-shifting
86. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920,
1923(a) (1988)).
87. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 85, at 207 (statement of Senator Bradbury).
88. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 161-62 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a)
(1988)).
89. Id.
90. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975) (ex-
plaining that limitations imposed by 1853 Act have not been repealed although attorney's fees
are explicitly permitted under certain statutes protecting federal rights).
91. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 161-62 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1923(a) (1988)). This rule applies to the federal courts. Id. If the action is solely one of
state law in a state court, then the Act would not apply. See id. (stating that Act extends only to
federal courts and thus has no application where state court tries state law issue).
92. See, e.g., Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257 (noting general rule that litigants pay own attorney's
fees absent statute or enforceable contract); United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 322 (1910)
(upholding attorney's fee clause in securities contract); Bainville v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands
Corp., 837 F.2d 128, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that contract may allocate responsibility
for attorney's fees, including where case is settled without adjudication); In re Burlington N.,
Inc. Employment Practices Litig., 832 F.2d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that American
Rule does not apply when contract shifts attorney's fees to loser).
93. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 24 (noting that contract clause exception was consis-
tent with laissez-faire principles of nineteenth century).
94. See, e.g., Aland v. Consumers Credit Corp., 476 F.2d 951, 953 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973)
(finding that contract clause in promissory note permitting "costs of suit" includes all costs
incurred in prosecuting suit, including attorney's fees).
95. See, e.g., Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231, 1239 (5th Cir. 1982)
(awarding attorney's fees for bill of sale and noting that prevailing party in indemnity claim is
entitled to attorney's fees incurred in defending principal claim).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins., 374 US. 84, 92 (1963) (reversing state
court decision to subordinate federal tax lien to lien for attorney's fees in mortgage contract).
97. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins., 637 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1981)
(upholding attorney's fee award for services attributable to amount due under insurance pol-
icy, but denying award for bad faith or its results, including inflation loss).
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contractual arrangements involve prelitigation agreements;98 the
courts, however, have also upheld postlitigation fee-shifting agree-
ments.99 Nevertheless, contractual clauses providing for the pay-
ment of attorney's fees are disfavored and unenforceable if they are
found to be contrary to public policy.' 00 This situation may arise
when the more powerful party has drafted the document, such as
with insurance agreements.'10
2. Common fund
The "common fund" doctrine is a commonly used equitable ex-
ception to the American Rule.' 0 2 Both federal and state courts em-
ploy this exception to compensate parties who create or preserve a
common fund for the benefit of others.' 0 3 The doctrine is typically
applied in class actions;' 0 4 it is also applied, however, in a variety of-
other circumstances that create or preserve funds that benefit enti-
ties not parties to the particular litigation.' 0 5
Although the courts first applied the doctrine in 1877,106 they did
not fully explain its principles until the 1882 case of Trustees v. Green-
ough.' 07 This case involved the Internal Improvement Fund of Flor-
ida, which used the proceeds from the sale of state holdings to
provide security for railroad bonds.108 A large bondholder for a de-
funct railroad sued the fund trustees for wasting the fund's assets
98. See I DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 6.02[2], at 6-3 (observing that most fee-
shifting agreements predate litigation, and adding that such agreements are common in many
types of contracts).
99. See I DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 6.02[2], at 6-9 to 6-10 (stating that parties
might enter fee agreement after litigation commences, and adding that such agreements usu-
ally arise in settlement context).
100. Hoak, supra note 15, at 725.
101. See I HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW ON CONTRACTS 12.06[3], at 12-73 (1986)
(noting that contract may be found unenforceable due to inequality of bargaining power at
time contract is made).
102. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 2.01, at 2-3 (stating that common fund doc-
trine is widely recognized and broadly used exception to American Rule).
103. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 2.01, at 2-3.
104. See, e.g., Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D.
240, 248 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing well-settled practice of awarding attorney's fees for
lawyers recovering fund for benefit of class of persons through commercial litigation).
105. See, e.g., Honda v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 324, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that any law-
yer performing services that benefit claimants might deserve part of fee, "irrespective of
whether claimants were associated with" litigants).
106. See Cowdrey v. Galveston, Houston, & Henderson R.R., 93 U.S. 352, 355 (1877)
(discussing rights of trustees to retain from any funds received amounts "sufficient to meet all
reasonable liability contracted in the execution of their trust").
107. 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (awarding attorney's fees for work performed to preserve trust
fund).
108. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 528 (1882) (discussing fund consisting of
10 or 11 million acres of state-owned land pledged for payment of interest and principal on
bonds that were "largely in arrears").
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through fraudulent conveyances.' 0 9 As part of the award, the trial
court granted attorney's fees for the successful bondholder. 110 The
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and justified spreading the litigation
fees and costs among the remaining beneficiaries on three
grounds. "' First, the Court reasoned that it would be unjust for the
plaintiff bondholder to bear the cost of the entire litigation when all
nonlitigant bondholders benefited.' 12 Second, the nonparticipating
bondholders would have an unfair advantage.' 13 Third, courts of
equity had historically awarded fees from court-controlled funds in
suits by creditors that benefited other creditors through bankruptcy
proceedings, where administration costs and attorney's fees were
payable from the bankrupt assets.' 14 The common fund doctrine
became firmly entrenched after the Greenough decision and was ex-
panded to funds created by legislative and administrative actions. 115
In 1939, the Supreme Court further expanded the common fund
doctrine by awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff, a depositor in a
trust account, against the beneficiaries of other trust account depos-
itors. 116 In this case, the plaintiff filed suit against her bank and a
successor bank that had gone bankrupt. 17 The plaintiff had depos-
ited her money in a trust account that was secured by bonds." 8 Af-
ter receiving an award in her favor, the plaintiff moved for her
attorney's fees to be charged against fourteen other trust accounts
secured by the bonds. 119 The court allowed recovery of the fees
from the other trust accounts despite the fact that the case had not
been brought as a class action and did not create funds for the other
109. See id. at 528-29 (stating that plaintiffs basis for suit was to enjoin trustees from
making fraudulent land conveyances that wasted and destroyed fund by selling land at nomi-
nal prices without servicing bonds).
110. Id. at 530-31.
11I. Id. at 534-35.
112. Id. at 534; see idL at 532 (explaining that "where the [suit] was filed not only in behalf
of the complainant himself,... and the other bondholders have come in and participated in
the benefits resulting from his proceedings, - if the complainant is not a trustee, he has at
least acted the part of a trustee in relation to the common interest").
113. See id. at 534-35 (discussing bankruptcy as benefit to unsecured creditors where
favorable court decree gives creditors proportionate advantage over party incurring expense
of suit).
114. See id (noting "equities" of permitting fee shifting to reimburse plaintiff for protect-
ing mortgages or other assets for all creditors).
115. See, e.g., Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 792, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
(upholding award of legal fees to attorney representing labor union before Regional War
Labor Board regarding payments under New York insurance laws).
116. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (holding that petitioner's
enforcement of bank's fiduciary obligation vindicates beneficiaries of trust who are not before
court but are similarly situated).
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id. at 162-63.
119. Id. at 163.
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accounts. 120
The common fund doctrine has since been applied to a variety of
situations, including antitrust litigation,' 2 ' mass disaster torts, 22
and class actions. 123 A litigant must satisfy three requirements for
the doctrine to apply. First, a fund must exist. 124 Second, a court
must be capable of exerting control over the fund. 125 Third, the
fund beneficiaries must be identifiable so that the court can shift the
attorney's fees to those aided by the litigation. 26
3. Substantial benefit doctrine
The substantial benefit rule is closely related to the common fund
doctrine. Both doctrines are based on the equitable principle that
nonparties benefiting from litigation should share in the legal ex-
penses of the party bringing the action; this principle avoids unjustly
enriching the absent beneficiaries.' 27 Unlike the common fund doc-
trine, however, the substantial benefit doctrine usually applies to
nonpecuniary benefits.128
Although the two doctrines are sometimes considered to be
equivalent,' 29 significant differences distinguish the common fund
doctrine from the substantial benefit rule. The substantial benefit
rule does not usually apply to cases involving a fund.' 30 When liti-
gation does not focus on or only indirectly affects an existing fund,
120. See id. at 166 ("That the party in a situation like the present neither purported to sue
for a class nor formally established by litigation a fund available to the class, does not seem to
be a differentiating factor so far as it affects the source of the recognized power of equity to
grant reimbursements .... ).
121. See Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1656, 1656 (1972) (discussing § 4 of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988), which permits
awards of attorney's fees because such antitrust suits benefit "the great mass of people").
122. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir.
1977) (discussing court's power to manage complex tort litigation by requiring shifting of
costs to representatives who essentially protect interests of coparties).
123. See, e.g., Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.
1981) (permitting award of attorney's fees where successful action for injunctive relief bene-
fited large and indefinite class).
124. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 2.02[l], at 2-12.
125. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 2.02(1], at 2-12.
126. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 2.02(1], at 2-12.
127. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 3.01(1], at 3-2.
128. See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 768 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977)
(discussing recent advent of substantial benefit rule as significant variation on common fund
approach in cases where funds are not established).
129. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264-67 n.39 (1975)
(discussing courts' "common-fund and common-benefit" decisions but failing to distinguish
between existence and nonexistence of fund).
130. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (discussing award of attorney's fees
where plaintiff shareholder succeeds in enforcing statute under Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to benefit all shareholders against corporate merger based on misleading proxy state-
ment and noting inapplicability of common fund doctrine because no fund exists).
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the substantial benefit exception applies. 31 In litigation seeking
both monetary and nonmonetary awards, either one or both of the
doctrines apply.13 2 Neither doctrine, however, imposes personal li-
ability on the beneficiaries. 133 Because a fund is not available in
substantial benefit cases, the court must have control over an entity
composed of the beneficiaries to charge the fee award.' 3 4
While the cases distinguishing the substantial benefit rule from
the common fund doctrine are only a few decades old, the origin of
the substantial benefit rule can be traced to 1921.135 Corporate
shareholder suits and union member actions are typical of the types
of cases that apply the substantial benefit doctrine. For example, in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,136 minority shareholders brought a de-
rivative action to rescind a merger.'3 7 Although the shareholders
did not expect the suit to produce a monetary recovery from which
litigation fees could be awarded, the Supreme Court in Mills re-
manded the case and recommended the award of attorney's fees
against the corporation because the minority shareholders' action,
which proved that the corporation violated the securities law, con-
ferred a substantial benefit on all of the corporation's sharehold-
ers.' 38 Similar cases have awarded attorney's fees under the
substantial benefit rule in instances where shareholders forced the
corporation to declare a dividend, 3 9 attacked stock acquisition
plans, 40 and recovered short-swing profits.' 4'
131. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1970) (discussing sub-
stantial benefit doctrine as applicable in shareholder derivative actions where no fund exists
directly, and noting that attorney's fees might be assessed based on enhanced stock value to
absent shareholders).
132. See, e.g., Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1122-23 (9th Cir.
1981) (stating that qualifying for fee-shift award requires either imparting of substantial non-
monetary benefit or preservation of common fund or both if one doctrine is to apply).
133. See 1 DERFNER & WoLF, supra note 11, 3.01[1], at 3-2 to 3-3 (stating that while both
common fund and substantial benefit doctrines are based on premise that persons directly
benefiting from plaintiff's lawsuit share incurred expenses to prevent unjust enrichment of
absent beneficiaries, neither doctrine imposes personal liability on absent beneficiaries).
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (explaining that attorney's fees may be
assessed against group that receives benefits from litigation despite lack of common fund).
135. See Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921) (holding that rendering of profes-
sional services in promoting legislation that protects substantial property interests for class of
beneficiaries is compensable through beneficiaries).
136. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
137. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1970).
138. Id. at 392-93, 397.
139. See, e.g., Altman v. Central of Georgia Ry., 540 F.2d 1105, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding that plaintiff shareholders caused railroad to pay dividend, thus benefiting all share-
holders and entitling attorney to award of fees).
140. See, e.g., Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir. 1974)
(holding plaintiffs' derivative suits as "succeeding in delaying consummation of the risky re-
purchase plan," which would have produced adverse effect on corporation's capital structure,
and thus provided benefit to shareholders).
141. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.) (permitting fee shift
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Most union litigation applying the substantial benefit rule falls
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959.142 Union members usually bring these actions against union
officials for allegedly oppressive and corrupt conduct that violates
the statute.' 43 Like shareholder suits, successful union litigation
does not usually result in monetary awards. 144 Nonetheless, the
benefit of compliance conferred on the entire union renders the
union responsible for the fee award. 145 The substantial benefit doc-
trine has had limited application beyond the corporate and union
cases, especially after the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 14 6 which blocked actions
against governmental entities. 147
4. Contempt
In Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.,148 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a party who seeks to enforce a final judgment
through contempt proceedings may recover attorney's fees for en-
forcement of the contempt order. 149 Another court expanded this
equitable exception to the American Rule to include instances
where a party's procedural rights had been violated prior to final
judgment. 50 As a general rule, the willfulness of the contempt is a
relevant factor in determining whether fees will be awarded and the
in derivative action by shareholders to recover $18,000 profit from management's securities
transactions despite minimal benefits to all shareholders), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
142. See 29 U.S.C §§ 401-531 (1988) (providing procedures for reporting and disclosing
information between labor union and management to prevent improper practices by labor
organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and labor representatives).
143. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 3.01[4], at 3-9 n.33 (providing case examples
where attorney's fees have been awarded following successful challenges to union actions).
144. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 3.01[4], at 3-9 (discussing use of substantial
benefit doctrine in union suits where nonmonetary benefit of challenging corrupt, oppressive,
or antidemocratic practices is conferred on all members).
145. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 3.01[4], at 3-9 (stating that because success-
ful plaintiffs confer significant, nonmonetary benefits to other union members, namely en-
joining unfair union practices, award of attorney's fees has been based on substantial benefit
doctrine).
146. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
147. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) (over-
ruling "private attorney general" exception to American Rule, where private litigant sues gov-
ernment or private entities under statutes deemed by courts to further important public
policies but containing no express fee-shifting provisions).
148. 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
149. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427-28 (1923) ("Certainly it
was not an abuse of discretion in this case to impose as a penalty, compensation for the ex-
penses incurred by the successful party to the decree in defending its right .... ).
150. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 378 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding de-
fendants in contempt for violation of disciplinary rules because ofexparte contact with mem-
bers of plaintiffs class, and awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff bringing motion to correct
defendant's actions).
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amount of such fees. 151 Also, courts limit the fee award to the actual
amount incurred in prosecuting the contempt; the award may in-
clude fees for time spent investigating the extent of the contempt' 52
and time spent on appeal.' 55
5. Bad faith
Based on the court's inherent equitable powers, which derived
from the English Chancery Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit assessed fees against a plaintiff for bringing an
"unwarranted," "baseless," and "vexatious" action. '54 Similarly,
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a court had the equitable
power to award attorney's fees "to a successful party when his [or
her] opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons."1 55 The Court has expanded this exception to
the American Rule to permit either plaintiffs or defendants to re-
cover attorney's fees when opponents exhibit bad faith conduct
either before or following a lawsuit.'56
The bad faith exception applies to conduct exhibited by a party or
a party's attorney, and the fees may be assessed against either the
party or the attorney, 57 including a governmental party. 158 The
151. See, e.g., Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1966) (award-
ing attorney's fees to appellee based on "flagrant and contumacious character of appellant's
defiance" of prior court orders); Gaddis v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (denying plaintiff's motion for fees based on defendant's nonwillful contempt).
152. See, e.g., Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 130-31 (5th
Cir. 1973) (permitting award of discovery expenses when appellant disobeyed court order and
appellee incurred cost in determining whether appellant acted in contempt of such order).
153. See, e.g., Crane, 367 F.2d at 776 (holding that appellant's defiance ofcourt order war-
ranted reimbursement of appellee's expenses incurred during appeal, including interest,
damages, and costs).
154. See Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. R.R., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928)
(describing bad faith classes of English Chancery Court cases allowing fee awards and accept-
ance of such cases in U.S. courts, especially where courts of equity remained distinct from
courts of law), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
155. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-30
(1974) (discussing various fee-shifting doctrines recognized by Court, including bad faith and
substantial benefit).
156. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (stating that bad
faith "may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of
the litigation"); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962) (holding that defendant's bad
faith recalcitrance prior to litigation forced plaintiff into hiring attorney and bringing action
"to get what was plainly owed him" under law).
157. See, e.g., Thonen v.Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that district court
may levy attorney's fees against defendants in their individual or official capacities as adminis-
trators of state university despite criticisms that awards against state officials violate eleventh
amendment of U.S. Constitution); Selfridge v. Gynecol, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (D. Mass.
1983) (stating that in cases where attorney demonstrates "appalling degree of irresponsibil-
ity," award of attorney's fees should be paid by counsel rather than defendant).
158. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988) (permitting award of
attorney's fees in civil actions against United States "to the same extent that any other party
would be liable" under common law or by statute); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
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bad faith exception is not reserved only for the unsuccessful litigant;
attorney's fees may also be assessed against a successful litigant who
acts in bad faith.' 59 Although bad faith may include conduct that is
found to be in contempt of court, the bad faith exception is much
broader than the contempt exception. For example, courts use the
bad faith rule to exercise their authority over a recalcitrant liti-
gant.' 60 Courts base the use of the rule on the need to punish par-
ties who abuse the judicial process;' 6' in contrast, the common fund
and substantial benefit doctrines are premised on compensation. 62
Because of the punitive nature of the bad faith exception, it might
apply to conduct giving rise to punitive damages. 63
Bad faith can occur before suit is brought, and courts have
awarded fees for such prelitigation conduct as fraud,'6 failure to
abide by an arbitration award,' 65 breach of a fiduciary duty,1 66 fail-
ure to abide by the clear dictates of a law,' 67 and continuous at-
tempts to litigate actions barred by res judicata. 168 Parties have
559 (1988) (stating that Equal Access to Justice Act requires administrative agency to award
attorney's fees to prevailing litigant in agency adjudication whenever Government's position
is not "substantially justified").
159. See, e.g., McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971) ("While this
may be unusual in that defendants have prevailed on appeal, we think that assessment of
attorney's fees against prevailing party provides substantial justice since plaintiff was forced to
go to court to obtain the statement of reasons to which he was constitutionally entitled."), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
160. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2123,2126 (1991) (holding that courts
have inherent power to shift fees, not as matter of substantive remedy, but as matter of vindi-
cating judicial authority against bad faith displayed toward other party and court).
161. See, e.g., Hoover v. Armco, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 184, 186 (W.D. Mo. 1988) ("The pur-
pose behind the bad faith exception to the American Rule is to punish the individual who
brings a suit in bad faith rather than to compensate the victim.").
162. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978) (distinguishing between bad faith
award as remedial fine versus compensatory action because court makes "no effort to ade-
quately compensate counsel" for work done or time spent on case); see also supra notes 102-03,
127 and accompanying text (describing compensation element in both doctrines).
163. Cf. Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing stan-
dard for punitive damages, such as when defendant acts "willfully and in gross disregard for
the rights of the complaining party").
164. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 649, 654 (E.D.
Pa.) (awarding attorney's fees on "reasonable counsel" standard versus fraudulently inflated
fees charged by plaintiff), af'd, 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
165. See, e.g., International Union of Dist. 50 v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934, 936
(5th Cir. 1970) (awarding attorney's fees based on "unmistakable national policy" to en-
courage arbitration and directing company to abide by arbitration decision).
166. See, e.g., Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473,481 (4th Cir. 1951) (justify-
ing award of attorney's fees when union members "of small means have been subjected to
discriminating and oppressive conduct by a powerful labor organization which was required,
as a bargaining agent, to protect their interests").
167. See, e.g., Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, 780 F.2d 766, 772 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
appellant's lawsuit was plainly frivolous, brought in bad faith, and brought only for purposes
of harassment in action challenging federal tax withholdings by employer).
168. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 388 (2d
Cir. 1985) (upholding district court's award of attorney's fees based on defendant's repeated
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instituted bad faith actions against defendants for forcing plaintiffs
to bring suit and against plaintiffs for filing vexatious claims. 169 The
bad faith rule does not apply, however, to conduct that gives rise to
the substantive claim itself.170 Thus, it is often difficult to determine
whether bad faith conduct is part of the substantive claim or part of
actionable prelitigation conduct that forces a party to bring suit.171
After a party files suit, the court may award attorney's fees to pun-
ish conduct that unnecessarily prolongs or delays the litigation or is
malicious in nature. 172 A court may also award a bad faith fee
against a party for asserting nonmeritorious claims, defenses, or
motions, or for other bad faith conduct. 173 Similarly, courts have
granted fee awards for abusive conduct involving submission of fal-
sified records, misrepresentation of evidence, failure to appear in
court, concealment of documents and witnesses, failure to cooper-
ate in discovery, unnecessary, groundless or vexatious motions, and
assertion of patently frivolous defenses.' 74
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. ,175 the U.S. Supreme Court defined the
bad faith exception and its relation to procedural rules and state fee-
shifting statutes. The Court in Chambers affirmed the trial court's
assertions of "baseless positions taken in the district court" during two previous hearings),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
169. Compare Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (permitting award of at-
torney's fees to plaintiff after defendant ignored duty to investigate plaintiff's injury claim,
thus requiring plaintiff to hire attorney to force defendant into compliance) with Nemeroff v.
Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1983) (permitting award of attorney's fees to defend-
ant after plaintiff failed to perform discovery or to substantiate allegations in suit).
170. See, e.g., Shimman v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 744 F.2d
1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Attorney fees incurred while curing the original wrong are not
compensable because they represent the cost of maintaining open access to an equitable sys-
tem ofjustice."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
171. See id. at 1230 (stating that care must be taken when distinguishing defendant's bad
faith in bringing or maintaining action from bad faith in acts giving rise to action).
172. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2146-47 (1991) (upholding
district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff because defendant's actions sought to de-
feat plaintiff's claim by "harassment, repeated and endless delay, mountainous expense and
waste of financial resources").
173. See 1 DERFNER & WoLF, supra note 11, 4.01[2][b], at 4-10 to 4-10.4 (discussing bad
faith in litigation as basis for exception to American Rule). Completely specious pleadings
question the substantive merit of a party's claim or defense, whereas bad faith might be based
on conduct that is abusive even when the party's pleadings have substantive merit. Thus,
there is a distinction between procedural and substantive bad faith conduct. I DERFNER &
WOLF, supra note 11, 4.0112][b], at 4-10.1.
174. See generally 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 4.01[2][b], at 4-10.1 to -10.2 (listing
numerous examples where attorney's fees were awarded based on procedural bad faith con-
duct, despite meritorious claims).
175. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). For an excellent discussion of the Court's opinion and the
bad faith exception to the American Rule, see Note, Sanctions and the Inherent Power: The
Supreme Court Expands the American Rule's Bad Faith Exception for Fee Shifing-Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 16 NovA L. REV. 1527 (1992) (concluding that Supreme Court reached fair
result for wrong reasons by invoking power to sanction when federal rules were available to
sanction attorney's conduct).
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sanction of almost $1 million, an amount equal to the attorney's fees
NASCO paid for the entire litigation. 176 This decision is notable
because all of the bad faith conduct fell beyond the scope of the
sanction provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 177 Ad-
ditionally, the Court rejected Chambers' argument that the trial
court had no power to assess attorney's fees for his bad faith behav-
ior 178 even though the state law that applied under the diversity ju-
risdiction of the trial court made no provisions for attorney fee
shifting. 179 The Court's decision in Chambers is based squarely on a
court's inherent power to use its equitable discretion to control a
party who has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons."' 8 0 Also, a court's equitable power to police itself
is not limited by state substantive policy, such as fee-shifting stat-
utes, or by the federal rules sanctions for limited types of abusive
acts. 181
6. Statutes and rules of procedure
The final exception to the American Rule is based on statutes and
the sanctioning provisions of court procedural rules. Some contro-
versy exists as to whether the power to prescribe judicial procedural
rules is vested in the legislature or in the courts.18 2 It appears that
Congress has such power, at least for the lower federal courts. To
the extent that judicial procedural rules are statutorily based, they
can be treated the same as other statutory exceptions to the Ameri-
can Rule. Assuming that the power to make procedural rules isjudi-
cial, this power can be treated as the same type of discretionary
power applied in the bad faith exception. Because attorneys should
be familiar with the sanction provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 83 these fee-shifting procedures will not be addressed
here.
Statutory provisions for shifting attorney's fees are not really ex-
176. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2140 (1991).
177. IL at 2130-31; see FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing for remedy of attorney sanctions at
discretion of court).
178. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2131.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2133.
181. Id at 2136.
182. Cf. 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1001, at 6 (2d ed. 1987) (describing federal judicial rules system as 'judicial rulemaking
pursuant to a legislative delegation and subject to congressional veto").
183. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26, 30, 37, 50 (providing attorney's fees as sanctions for
disregard of federal procedural requirements); Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2129 n.3, 2131 n.8
(discussing various provisions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that permit or require
attorney's fees as sanction against attorney misconduct).
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ceptions to the American Rule, but a part of it.184 As originally ap-
plied in colonial America and by the new Union, attorney's fees
assessed as taxable costs to the losing party were only those costs
that were statutorily authorized.' 8 5 The American Rule is merely a
recognition in practical terms that there is no real shifting of attor-
ney's fees from a loser to a winner in litigation because of the nomi-
nal amounts, if any, provided for in the statutes.18 6 It is only when
the American Rule is viewed as prohibiting a prevailing party from
recovering attorney's fees that a statute can be considered an excep-
tion to the rule.'8 7
There are over 200 federal statutes188 and almost 2000 state stat-
utes' 8 9 that provide for shifting of attorney's fees. Thus, if the
American Rule is defined as prohibiting fee shifting, the definition is
riddled with exceptions. The major purpose of state fee-shifting
legislation is to compensate the prevailing plaintiff, promote public
interest litigation, punish or deter the losing party for misconduct,
or prevent abuse of the judicial system. 190
The most notable recent fee-shifting legislation involves what is
generally called "public interest" litigation. 19 ' Public interest legis-
lation reflects the "carrot" rather than the "stick" approach as Con-
gress has "opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to
implement public policy." 92 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
184. See Mary F. Derfner, The True "American Rule " Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Inter-
est, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 251, 281 (1979) (stating that statutory provision! authorizing fee
awards "are not exceptions to, but an integral part of, the American Rule").
185. See supra notes 26-72 and accompanying text (discussing development of American
Rule).
186. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (describing 1853 fee bill, still in effect,
that grants nominal compensation based on fee shifting from loser to winner).
187. SeeJane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys'FeesforAbuses oftheJudicial System, 61 N.C. L. REV.
613, 615 (1983) (noting "firmly rooted" principle of nonreimbursement of attorney's fees in
American practice).
188. See 3 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, Table of Statutes, TSI-TS36 (providing alpha-
betical list of statutes and cross references to appropriate sections that provide for award of
attorney's fees); see also E. Richard Larson, Current Proposals in Congress to Limit and to Bar Court-
Awarded Attorneys'Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 14 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 523, 523-24 (1986)
(stating that majority ofcourt awards for attorney's fees are presently based on express statu-
tory provision rather than doctrinal theories such as common fund or substantial benefit).
189. See Note, Fee Shifting Statutes, supra note 58, at 321, 336 (listing 1974 state fee-shifting
statutes).
190. See Note, Fee Shifting Statutes, supra note 58, at 334 (listing indemnity and equalization
as purposes of state statutes).
191. See Larson, supra note 188, at 537 (stating that Congress believes that fee-shifting
statutes enforce private parties' civil rights by providing financial incentives that attract
counsel).
192. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) (stating that
Congress has authority to allow courts to award attorney's fees when private enforcement of
specific statutes furthers public policy).
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Awards Act of 1976,193 the Equal Access to Justice Act, 194 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965195 are typical examples of such legisla-
tion. Public interest legislation covers a broad range of environ-
mental and consumer subjects, such as the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977,196 the Truth in Lending Act, 197 the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 198 the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 199 the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 0 the Toxic Substances Control
Act,20' the Endangered Species Act,20 2 and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.20 3 These fee-shifting statutes can be broadly classified
as one-way shift statutes or two-way shift statutes.
a. One-way shift
In this system, the legislature or the courts20 4 have determined
193. See 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1988) (providing reasonable attorney's fees for prevailing
party, other than United States, in actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986, and
other civil rights statutes).
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988) (permitting agency that conducts adversary adjudica-
tion to award fees to prevailing party unless judicial officer finds agency position substantially
justified based on administrative record); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988) (permitting courts with
jurisdiction to award attorney's fees in civil actions, including judicial review of agency
adjudications).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees in
actions enforcing voting guarantees under fourteenth and fifteenth amendments).
196. See 30 U.S.C. § 938(c) (1988) (requiring payment of attorney's fees following grant
of relief to miners suffering from black lung disorders).
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees in
successful action to enforce liability against lender failing to comply with transaction and dis-
closure requirements of Act or when right of recision exists in consumer credit agreements).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees in
successful action or class action against discriminating creditors).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1988) (permitting consumer to receive reasonable attorney's
fees in successful action against credit reporting agencies that fail to follow procedures for
evaluating credit ratings).
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees fol-
lowing consumer's successful petition for appellate review of consumer product safety rule);
15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees in successful suit
for knowing or willful violation of consumer product safety rule).
201. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees fol-
lowing judicial review of compliance with statutory rules and orders regarding use, disposal,
distribution, and processing of toxic chemicals); 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (1988) (permitting
award of reasonable attorney's fees in civil actions challenging compliance with statutory rules
and orders regarding toxic chemicals); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4)(C) (1988) (permitting award of
reasonable attorney's fees following final order that initiates proceedings for issuance, amend-
ment, or repeal of rules regarding statutory procedures for toxic chemicals).
202. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees
following final order in suit challenging compliance with statutory provisions protecting en-
dangered species).
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988) (permitting award of reasonable attorney's fees
against federal government in actions challenging withholding of information under Freedom
of Information Act). A comprehensive list of all fee-shifting legislation is accumulated else-
where. See generally 1-3 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note I 1 (providing excellent compilation and
explanation of fee-shifting statutes).
204. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 5.02[3]-[4], at 5-12 to 5-14 (explaining that
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that fees are to be shifted in favor of only one party.20 5 Thus, if the
plaintiff were the chosen beneficiary, a successful plaintiff would re-
cover attorney's fees while a successful defendant would not.20 6
b. Two-way shift
This is the loser-pays rule commonly attributed to the English sys-
tem.20 7 In this system, the loser, whether plaintiff or defendant,
must pay the winner's attorney's fees. 208 Recent studies and articles
show that the vast majority of legislation in the United States has
adopted a one-way shift in favor of the plaintiff.20 9
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AMERICAN RULE
Several commentators have heavily criticized the American Rule,
suggesting that it be replaced with a loser-pays, or two-way shift,
rule.2 10 Most proponents of the two-way shift compare the Ameri-
approximately half of fee-shifting statutes are mandatory and half allow fee shifting at discre-
ton of court).
205. See I DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 1 5.02[5], at 5-8 (characterizing one-way fee-
shifting statutes as allowing recovery by party seeking to promote congressional policy).
206. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 5.02[5], at 5-14 to 5-15.
207. See 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 5.02[6], at 5-16 (discussing two-way shifting
provisions as ill-suited to American Rule); see also supra notes 16-25 (describing history and
procedure of English Rule).
208. 1 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 5.02[6], at 5-16.
209. 2 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 11, 17.03[1], at 17-9 to 17-10; see Derfner, supra
note 184, at 259 (stating that between 1870 and 1964, most federal statutes contained one-
way fee-shifting provisions); Note, Fee Shifting Statutes, supra note 58, at 331 (analyzing state
fee-shifting statutes and noting that large number of statutes favor one party over another);
Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litiga-
tion, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233, 240-41 (stating that one-way shifting in
favor of successful plaintiffs is most common scheme in attorney's fees awards legislation).
210. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792-800 (making plea on behalf of
"little man" for reform of law of counsel fees and referring to current law as "festering cancer
in the body of our law"); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CAL. ST. BJ.
107, 110-15 (1951) [hereinafter Ehrenzweig, Counsel Fees] (considering treatment of attorney's
fees under English law and suggesting scheme of percentage compensation for each service
performed); Goodhart, supra note 15, at 877 (concluding that abuse of legal process follows
from current American system regarding attorney's fees); Howard Greenberger, The Cost of
Justice: An American Problem, an English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REv. 400, 414 (1964) (advocating
loser-pays rule based on thesis that successful party should be made whole by recovery and
emphasizing need to promote speedy resolution of controversies and to prevent judicial con-
gestion); Kuenzel, supra note 15, at 75, 86 (describing present cost arrangements as unjust
and offering "hypothetical" rather than "hard" research to show that current system is out-
dated and inappropriate and concluding that current law is based on theories from era when
litigation was encouraged); McCormick, supra note 15, at 638-43 (calling present rule product
of frontier conditions when battle of courtroom was seen as desirable way to settle conflicts
and rules of "fair play" demanded that no unnecessary burden be placed on loser); Starr,
supra note 15, at 226-30 (noting that criticisms of American Rule include contention that rule
is one factor contributing to increased congestion in courts, that fee shifting results in longer
court time and larger awards, that abandoning rule in favor of English Rule will result in
emergence of new group of attorneys to meet needs of litigants that are currently unmet by
legal aid, public interest groups, and contingent fee agreements, and suggesting that two-way
fee shifting may encourage more meritorious suits to be brought); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at
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can Rule with that of another country, usually England, and com-
pare the attributes of the two-way shift to the disadvantages of the
American Rule.2 11 The following are the most common of these
arguments.
A. Court Congestion and Colorable Claims
It is argued that U.S. courts are congested because of nonmerito-
rious claims or defenses. Supporters of this argument suggest that
the American Rule encourages frivolous suits because the rule does
not create an incentive to discontinue a lawsuit: the plaintiff does
not have to pay anything except his or her own fees and costs in the
event of a loss. 21 2 Similarly, a defendant may continue abusive prac-
tices because of the same lack of incentive. The proponents of the
English Rule argue that the risk of paying the winner's attorney's
fees would motivate litigants to stop these abusive practices and
would result in greater numbers of equitable settlements, thus re-
lieving courts of unnecessary litigation.2 13
B. Compensation
The "make whole" argument, the view that the winner should not
211-18 (criticizing current rule and proposing adoption of fee-shifting statute for reasonable
attorney's fees); cf. Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer Than Two-Way Fee Shifiing?, 141
F.R.D. 351, 352 (1992) (asserting that two-way fee shifting is fairer than one-way fee shifting,
but noting that ultimate determination of fairness of two-way fee shifting, in light of fact that
plaintiffs are generally poorer than defendants and more likely to feel risk of fee liability, is
beyond scope of article).
211. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 798 (asserting that England, "since
time immemorial," has permitted successful parties to recover counsel fees from losing oppo-
nents); Goodhart, supra note 15, at 872-77 (comparing English and American laws of cost);
Greenberger, supra note 210, at 400-14 (examining English caselaw and comparing procedure
for payment of attorney's fees with that in United States); Kuenzel, supra note 15, at 80-81
(comparing American Rule to English Rule and considering reasons why English Rule failed
to develop in United States); McCormick, supra note 15, at 619-21, 641 (discussing payment of
costs under English system and comparing English system with U.S. system); Stoebuck, supra
note 15, at 204-07 (describing English system and noting that Austria, Switzerland, and Hun-
gary use similar schemes).
212. See, e.g., Kuenzel, supra note 15, at 78 (hypothesizing that possible economic gain
entices people to bring frivolous claims); McCormick, supra note 15, at 643 (finding that sys-
tem of attorney's fees that encourages litigation exacerbates problem of scarce judicial re-
sources); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 202 (claiming that congestion in courts is due to nuisance
suits that never reach trial or that will be settled just before trial).
213. See Greenberger, supra note 210, at 400 (advocating change to English procedure of
fee shifting because substantial reform efforts have failed to cure strain on judicial system);
Kuenzel, supra note 15, at 75-80 (speculating that parties litigate meritless claims seeking fi-
nancial gain and that requiring parties who abuse system to pay fees for both sides will deter
such behavior); McCormick, supra note 15, at 643 (concluding that allowing winning litigant to
recover court costs from loser would likely reduce litigation in courts); Stoebuck, supra note
15, at 202 (suggesting that use of substantial attorney's fees to deter nuisance suits would not
require extensive change in American justice system); see also Mause, supra note 15, at 26-27,
34-36 (suggesting that fear of having to reimburse defendant would deter harassment and
other frivolous suits and would alleviate burden on courts by encouraging settlement).
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be penalized when the validity of a claim or defense has been
proven, provides the most appealing justification for the loser-pays
rule.214 This position is said to be especially true for the injured
party because it follows the make-whole rationale of tort law-"on
what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a
public highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill. '21 5
Supporters of a loser-pays rule also advance the make-whole ration-
ale to justify a winning defendant's right to recover attorney's
fees. 2 16
C. Small Claims
Approximately forty years ago, Professor Ehrenzweig condemned
the American Rule because he believed it prevented the "little man"
from seeking justice in the courts. 217 Professor Ehrenzweig based
this belief on his personal experience. When he immigrated to the
United States, a moving company cheated his family out of its only
belongings. 218 An American lawyer agreed to take the case but de-
manded $100 as a retainer.219 Professor Ehrenzweig stated: "I did
not understand. Would he not get his fees from the defendant, as he
would anywhere else in the world?" 220 In this unfortunate personal
example, Professor Ehrenzweig implies that attorneys practicing
214. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792 (contending that winning liti-
gants are not made whole when forced to pay own attorney's fees); Kuenzel, supra note 15, at
85 (noting that party might win case but find victory hollow due to extensive legal fees);
Mause, supra note 15, at 33 (arguing that fee shifting would allow small-claim plaintiffs to
pursue legitimate claims that legal fees now make economically inefficient); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra note 15, at 638 (questioning American system's ability to make
whole wronged litigants and to enable lower- and middle-income litigants to bring meritori-
ous small claims). But cf Stein, supra note 210, at 352-54 (discussing make-whole principle
and endorsing conclusion of other commentators that make-whole principle actually supports
one-way pro-plaintiff fee shifting, but not two-way fee shifting); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at
202 (questioning why American legal system maintains practice that deliberately frustrates
attainment of legal ideal that, in civil actions, wronged person shall be made whole "at least so
far as can be accomplished with money").
215. First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MAss. L.Q. 7, 64 (1925).
216. See McCormick, supra note 15, at 643 (stating that practice of complete compensation
for plaintiffs and defendants alike "seems most harmonious" with compensatory nature of
U.S. legal system); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 202 (using hypothetical situations to demon-
strate problems American Rule causes for defendants as well as plaintiffs); cf. Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra note 15, at 650-51 (asserting that cost of hiring attorney may
prevent defense of meritorious claims); Mause, supra note 15, at 28-30 (concluding that suc-
cessful defendant deserves indemnity when plaintiff's conduct in bringing action is wrongful).
217. See Ehrenzweig, Counsel Fees, supra note 210, at 107 (asserting that fear of unrecov-
ered cost is often strong enough to "compel complete submission instead of mere compro-
mise" and prevent litigants from defending meritorious claims); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement,
supra note 15, at 792-94 (asserting that reforming law of attorney's fees would benefit poor
more than "charity" of legal aid).
218. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792.
219. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792.
220. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792.
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under the two-way shift rule forego immediate payment of fees in
the hope of collecting them from an obviously guilty defendant.
III. THE FORGOTTEN FRAMEWORK OF FEE-SHIFTING RULES:
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The debate over the qualities of fee-shifting rules recognizes that
the chosen rule will have some effect on a party's willingness to liti-
gate. Sometimes framed as an issue of justice or equity, the debate
usually focuses on whether the plaintiff, who usually has less wealth
than the defendant, will be prevented from bringing or sustaining
an action.221 This issue is reflected in worldwide concern over ac-
cess to the legal system.222 Commentators are also concerned with
the more narrow issue of risk aversion. 223 Risk aversion may prop-
erly be part of the larger access-to-justice issue, but for clarity's sake
it will be discussed separately.
A. Risk Aversion
In sociological and psychological terms, risk aversion is defined as
the preference of a certain outcome (100% chance of occurrence) to
a risky one (less than 100% chance of occurrence) of equal or
greater expected value.224 Most people prefer certainty to risk.225
Thus, certain gains are preferred over probabilistic gains. This
logic would indicate that when loss replaces gain, most people
221. See Mause, supra note 15, at 36 (noting that requiring loser to indemnify winner
might put litigant with modest means at disadvantage and acknowledging that secondary ef-
fect of encouraging wealthy litigant to inflate fees to "terrorize" less affluent opponent is also
possibility); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra note 15, at 651-52 (conceding that
fee shifting could deter poor litigants with meritorious claims, but finding risk "acceptable");
cf. Stein, supra note 210, at 356 (contending that concerns about poor are, or could be, re-
flected in substantive rules of liability).
222. See generally Mauro Capelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 181, 196-288 (1978) (discussing
legal reform programs in United States, Austria, England, France, Netherlands, Germany,
Sweden, and Canada, and noting influence of courts in China, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and
India).
223. See Mallor, supra note 187, at 618-19, 648 (discussing deterrent effect of fee shifting
on certain class of people); Mause, supra note 15, at 32 (rejecting argument that litigants with
better than even chance of success would be "irrationally" deterred from litigating claims);
Monroe, supra note 15, at 164-67 (maintaining that risk of litigating would fall more heavily on
poor litigants under English Rule and that such rule discourages novel claims and defenses);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way '" Litigation, Alterna-
tives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 851-52, 888, 896 [hereinafter Rowe, Paths to a
Better Way] (explaining impact of fee shifting on risk-averse parties); Rowe, Legal Theory, supra
note 15, at 663-64, 671, 676 (considering relative wealth of parties in determining level of risk
aversion).
224. Robert A. Josephs et al., Protecting the Self from the Negative Consequences of Risky Deci-
sions, 62 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 26, 26 (1992).
225. See id. (citing typical example of risk aversion in study where majority of subjects
preferred certain gain of $800 to 85% chance of gaining $1000).
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would prefer a certain loss to a probabilistic loss. 226 This result,
however, is not true. Studies show people prefer a higher probabil-
istic loss to a lower certain loss. 227
In short, the studies show that people will be risk averse in gains
and risk seeking in losses.228 It is well recognized in the fields of
psychology, sociology, and economics that, with all other things be-
ing equal, in litigation the plaintiff is risk averse while the defendant
is either risk neutral or risk seeking.229 Individuals with low self-
esteem manifest greater than normal risk aversion.2 0 In personal
injury cases, the natural lowering of self-esteem accompanying the
plaintiff's injury magnifies risk aversion.23 l
B. Access to Justice
Access to justice focuses on two basic purposes of the legal sys-
tem. First, all people must have equal access to the legal system.2 32
Second, the results must be individually and socially just.23 3
Although legal systems historically recognized the formal right of ac-
cess for all, practical access was denied to the poor because only the
wealthy could afford to use the legal system. 2 4
226. Id
227. See id. (describing study where subjects preferred 85% chance of losing $100 to cer-
tain loss of $80).
228. See id. (explaining that reaction is called "reflection effect" because preference be-
tween negative prospects is "mirror image" of preference between positive prospects).
229. See David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961,
962 (1982) (discussing general risk-taking principles);JohnJ. Donohue III, Optingfor the British
Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1093, 1098 (1991) (using empirical analysis to show that only where plaintiff's probability of
success at trial is greater than 50% will trial occur); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 95, 99-100 (1974) (hereinafter
Galanter, Limits of Legal Change] (explaining that repeat players can "play the odds," whereas
one-shot players seek to minimize probability of maximum loss); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MicH.
L. REV. 319, 349, 384 (1991) (asserting that plaintiffs, especially personal injury plaintiffs, are
risk averse).
230. SeeJosephs, supra note 224, at 33 (explaining that people with low self-esteem have
difficulty facing threat created by failed decisions, and thus are likely to make decisions that
minimize possibility of regret); cf. Joel Brockner et al., Self-Esteem and Reactions to Negative Feed-
back: Toward Greater Generalizability, 21 J. RES. PERSONALTY 318, 328-30 (determining that
while low-self-esteem persons have greater negative expectations of successful task comple-
tion than high-self-esteem persons, low-self-esteem persons arguably act more adaptively).
But cf. Gary Wyatt, Risk-Taking and Risk-Avoiding Behavior: The Impact of Some Dispositional and
Situational Variables, 124 J. PSYCHOL. 437, 445 (1990) (finding that situational variables, e.g.,
value and probable outcome of alternatives, may be more significant than dispositional vari-
ables, e.g., self-concept, for predicting whether person will choose risky alternatives, and that
self-efficacy is more determinative than self-worth in determining propensity to take risks).
231. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 (suggesting that recent serious loss or
injury makes personal injury plaintiffs more risk averse).
232. Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 182.
233. Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 182.
234. See Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 183 (finding that in eighteenth and nine-
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Contemporary society, however, has moved toward a goal of
guaranteeing access to justice for all citizens. 23 5 The guarantee of
effective access to justice has been expressed as follows:
Optimal effectiveness in the context of a given substantive law
could be expressed as complete "equality of arms"-the assur-
ance that the ultimate result depends only on the relative legal
merits of the opposing positions, unrelated to differences which
are extraneous to legal strength and yet, as a practical matter, af-
fect the assertion and vindication of legal rights. This perfect
equality, of course, is utopia, as we have already implied; the dif-
ferences between parties can never be completely eradicated. The
question is how far to push toward the utopian goal, and at what
cost. In other words, how many of the "barriers" to effective
equality of arms can and should be attacked? 236
The goal of effective equality of litigants is the yardstick with which
a fee-shifting rule must be measured. If a fee-shifting rule promotes
effective equality of the parties, it is preferable to one that creates
barriers. Fee-shifting rules cannot be measured in isolation, for
they are part and parcel of a legal system. Thus, the synergistic ef-
fect between a fee-shifting rule and other access-to-justice issues
must be evaluated.
1. Costs
Litigation is expensive. 237 Attorney's fees probably comprise the
greatest expense. 238 The manner in which a legal system controls
the costs and provides a means of payment for attorney's fees can
affect access to the legal system.23 9 Time is also a concomitant part
of litigation costs because delays in proceedings increase the cost to
teenth centuries, justice was guaranteed only to those who could afford it because justice was
conceptualized as natural right and individual'i formal right to justice did not require affirma-
tive state action).
235. See Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 183-86 (tracing development of jurispru-
dence of rights and stressing that governments must not only grant formal rights, but also
affirmatively act to ensure enjoyment of those rights).
236. Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 186.
237. See Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 186-87 & n.1 1 (citing variety of studies that
present expenses involved in litigation and showing that litigation can cost up to one-half of
amount in controversy).
238. See Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 186-87 n.11 (reporting study that found
that in automobile accident case where victim received $3000, 35.5% of recovery went to
attorney and 8%o to other costs); Reginald S. Johnson, Another Side to "Settlement Hang-Ups",
MicH. LAw. WxLy., Feb. 8, 1993, at 4 (finding that attorney's fees in workers' compensation
cases usually are contingent percentage of total recovery less costs and that usual percentage
is one-third); Builder Offers Cash To Settle Huricane Lawsuits, UPI, Jan. 14, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (stating that attorney's fees and costs represent about 40% of
total settlement in homeowners' shoddy construction claims).
239. See Capelletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 186-88 (describing how legal costs can be
barrier to entry into legal system).
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litigants. 240
2. Parties' capabilities
Individuals and organizations with substantial resources can util-
ize the legal system because they can afford to pay legal costs and
withstand the effects of delay.24 1 A party lacking substantial re-
sources is at an obvious disadvantage. The disparity of resources
between litigants may result in one party outspending the other and,
as a result, affecting the result of the controversy.
Lack of resources is not the only barrier to effective justice. Pro-
fessor Galanter, in a series of articles, has described litigants as
either "one shot players" or "repeat players. ' 242 One shot players
are usually individuals with very limited exposure to the legal sys-
tem.243 Viewed as a group, one shot players are unorganized and
legally unsophisticated. 244 Repeat players, on the other hand, are
usually organizations, such as insurance companies or corporations,
that have frequent contacts and ongoing relationships with the legal
system.245 Repeat players generally come out ahead in litigation be-
cause of their relative advantages over one shot players. 246 Repeat
players gain advantage because of experience, expertise, economies
of scale that lower costs, established relationships with the legal in-
stitution, established credibility as litigants with "bargaining" repu-
tations, bargaining power gained by "playing the odds" over a
series of cases, influence over legal rules gained through methods
such as lobbying, and investment in resources that produce
favorable rules. 247
240. See Capeletti & Garth, supra note 222, at 189-90 (noting that delay can be devastating
to parties' ability to achieve justice because it increases costs and puts pressure on economi-
cally weak to abandon legitimate claims or settle for less than they deserve).
241. See Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 104 (suggesting that formally
neutral legal system may perpetuate advantages of wealthy and considering ways in which
institutional passivity and delay benefit wealthy parties by putting stress on poorer parties).
242. See Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 97-98 (explaining that one shot-
ters and repeat players should be thought of as "a continuum rather than as a dichotomous
pair," and giving examples of both types of claimants); Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining
Litigation, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 347, 347 (1975) [hereinafter Galanter, Aflerword] (defining
terms "one shotters" and "repeat players").
243. Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 97-98.
244. Cf Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 141-44 (advocating organiza-
tion of one shotters as means of reform).
245. Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 97.
246. See Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 99-104 (describing advantages
held by repeat players and how these advantages are augmented over time).
247. Galanter, Limits of Legal Change, supra note 229, at 98-103.
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IV. A NEW LOOK AT THE ENGLISH RULE: ITS APPLICATION AND
EFFECTS
A. Comparative Law
"Everybody's doing it." These are the opening words of an arti-
cle by one proponent of the English system,248 and such words form
the common denominator of similar articles. Because the rest of the
world applies a two-way shift, many commentators assume that it is
a beneficial rule that should be applied in the United States.249
Based on this assumption, one observer has called the United States
a "misfit" among nations. 250
In general, comparative studies are a common undertaking of law-
yers and political scientists. 251 These studies typically attempt to
isolate one particular element of the system under study.252 Once
isolated, this particular element is compared with the author's native
system.253 Several obvious problems arise from such compari-
sons.25 4 The examiner using this type of methodology may view the
foreign system through the "colored lenses" of his or her own cul-
tural, political, or historical perspectives.255 The author may try to
reduce this by becoming thoroughly acquainted with the alien sys-
tem.25 6 Such an approach requires more than a familiarity with the
248. Greenberger, supra note 210, at 400.
249. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 793 (calling American Rule
"pernicious historical relic" unknown in rest of world); Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Recovery of
Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 782 (1972)
(claiming that no other country follows American Rule and citing claim as factor discrediting
rule); Starr, supra note 15, at 189 (asserting that American Rule is unusual, representing ex-
ception rather than rule, from comparative law standpoint); Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 206-07
(finding that Austria, England, France, Hungary, and Switzerland allow recovery of substan-
tial attorney's fees under variety of schemes); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra
note 15, at 639 (declaring that in virtually every country except United States, courts award
attorney's fees to prevailing party as item of compensatory damage or cost necessary to full
recovery).
250. Starr, supra note 15, at 189. The former Solicitor General adds that "on leaving the
United States, one quickly discovers that the American Rule is a misfit in relation to the usual
approach to attorneys' fees awards." Id.
251. Thijmen Koopmans, Understanding Political Systems: A Comment on Methods of Compara-
tive Research, 17 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 261, 262 (1987).
252. See id. (noting that examples of these elements include judicial review, local self-gov-
ernment, electoral behavior, or decisionmaking in foreign affairs).
253. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MoD. L. REv. 1, 2-6
(1974) [hereinafter Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses] (listing areas where comparative law is
most frequently used and comparing comparative law process with "transplanting" kidney or
carburetor from one entity to another).
254. See id. (explaining, for example, that it might not be possible to understand one ele-
ment in isolation from entire system).
255. See Koopmans, supra note 251, at 262-63 (asserting that authors view their own way
of looking at things as only possible way and fail to take into account how their perceptions
are defined by their own legal and political culture).
256. See id. at 264 (suggesting that historical approach might help focus picture by ex-
plaining certain aspects of foreign system).
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isolated issue. One must understand how the issue is affected by the
foreign system's entire culture. 257
The United States, for example, has a large number of cases inter-
preting the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.258
Other countries may lack such a constitutional guarantee and may
have a relatively small number of cases discussing the issue. This
comparison may create the impression that U.S. citizens enjoy
greater freedom of religion than the citizens of the country in ques-
tion. Such a conclusion, however, may ignore the social tolerance
enjoyed by the citizens of the foreign country. 259
Researchers seeking to analyze a particular foreign system may
increase their understanding of that system through investigation
and field work, but full comprehension is improbable. For example,
some countries have developed "national myths" that may not be
fully understood by an outsider or a native. 260 Additionally, geo-
graphic, political, economic, sociological, and cultural factors all
have some interplay with any legal issue. 261 Thus, as one commen-
tator has noted, the use of comparative law as a basis for legal re-
form is fraught with danger:
My concern is not with comparative law as a tool of research or as
a tool of education, but with comparative law as a tool of law re-
form. What are the uses and what are the misuses of foreign mod-
els in the process of law making? What conditions must be
fulfilled in order to make it desirable or even to make it possible
257. See id. at 265-69 (concluding that, in addition to reading local literature, it is neces-
sary to perform field work, employ historical analysis, and assess political systems); Otto
Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAW Q REV. 40, 44 (1966) (asserting
that to understand legal process, one must consider social objectives pursued by legislators,
judges, and administrators, and questioning whether this task can be accomplished without
knowing about needs of society); Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 253, at 7-13 (not-
ing that first comparative lawyer, Montesquieu, warned against transplanting law without con-
sidering environment in which it was developed and acknowledging that while some factors
that concerned Montesquieu are no longer vital, others have become "overwhelming"); Mar-
tin Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 537, 537-39 (1980)
(considering impact of political parties on constitutional law).
258. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990);
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
259. See Koopmans, supra note 251, at 264-65 (explaining, for example, that while there is
more interesting caselaw in United States than in England regarding freedom of expression,
this result does not necessarily mean that U.S. citizens actually enjoy more freedom of expres-
sion; English society, "with its love of eccentricity," might be more tolerant).
260. See Koopmans, supra note 251, at 266-67 (stating that these myths might be in fore-
front of political systems or operate in background completely forgotten).
261. Cf Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 253, at 8 (maintaining that while differ-
ences in geographic, economic, social, and cultural elements have lost importance, political
factors have gained importance).
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for those who prepare new legislation to avail themselves of rules
or institutions developed in foreign countries? 262
Such observations could lead to the conclusion that comparative law
is a useless or impossible endeavor. This conclusion is inaccurate
because comparative law appears to have its greatest value in pro-
viding general concepts and ideas.263 These general ideas, how-
ever, must be understood in both the contexts in which they arose
and the contexts in which they will be applied. 264
Past comparative examinations of fee-shifting rules have been de-
ficient in attempting to explain the context in which such rules
arose. For example, as applied in many countries, the two-way-shift
rule is only a partial shift that does not provide full compensation to
the winner.265 When a two-way shift prevents access to the legal
system, some countries provide alternative means of access. Euro-
pean nations use legal insurance to pay for legal costs, including
those awarded to the winner. 266 Also, legal aid in many countries
might pay the loser's costs. 2 67 Systems outside the law may amelio-
rate the adverse affects of a two-way shift. For example, the United
262. Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 253, at 1-2.
263. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAw Q. REv. 79, 79 (1976)
(emphasizing that comparative law reformers should be looking at foreign systems for ideas
that could be transplanted into laws of their own country); Edward M. Wise, The Transplant of
Legal Patterns, 38 AM.J. COMP. L. 1, 2-12 (Supp. 1990) (stating that while law exists in dialecti-
cal relationship with society, it is relatively autonomous and develops mainly from borrowing
ideas from outside systems).
264. Professor Kahn-Freund, in a lecture delivered at the London School of Economics,
stated:
[W]e cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable. The crite-
ria answering the question whether or how far they are, have changed since Montes-
quieu's day, but any attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its
origin continues to entail the risk of rejection. The consciousness of this risk will
not, I hope, deter legislators in this or any other country from using the comparative
method. All I have wanted to suggest is that its use requires a knowledge not only of
the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its political, context. The use of
comparative law for practical purposes becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a
legalistic spirit which ignores this context of the law. I am appealing to those who
teach comparative law to be aware of this risk and to transmit that awareness to their
students among whom there may be those called upon to promote the exchange of
legal ideas in the processes of legislation.
Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 253, at 27.
265. See infra notes 331, 392 and accompanying text (describing recoverable party/party
costs in England and Australia). In England, under the party/party system, winning parties
are generally able to recover two-thirds of the actual solicitor charges. See infra note 331 and
accompanying text (noting that party/party winnings do not cover all of litigation costs). In
Australia, the winning parties usually recover between one-half and two-thirds of their costs.
See infra note 392 and accompanying text (observing that winners' recoverable costs in Austra-
lia parallel recoverable costs in England).
266. See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifling, LAw & Cow-
TEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37, 77-81 (asserting that legal expense insurance was intro-
duced in Europe over 60 years ago and is standard type of insurance coverage).
267. See id. at 64-65 (commenting on cost allocation and legal aid and noting that while
English legal aid law authorizes court to determine amount paid by losing legal-aid-assisted
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States has extremely high health-care costs and an inadequate pub-
lic welfare system,268 whereas many two-way shift nations have rela-
tively low health care costs or substantial welfare benefits. 269 In
two-way shift countries, the effect of the two-way shift of limiting
access to justice in personal injury suits is not as significant as in the
United States, where lack of access to justice might result in lack of
access to medical treatment. These are only a few of the cultural
differences that may account for the vitality of the loser-pays rule in
other countries.
The critics of the American Rule not only fail to examine the cul-
tural context of the two-way shift rule, but also fail to examine ade-
quately the potential effects of the application of the rule in the
United States. 270 This failure has resulted in part from reliance on
other nations' beliefs concerning the benefits of the loser-pays rule
and the assumption that such benefits are appropriate in the United
States. Critics of the American Rule also fail to distinguish other
nations' myths from facts. The critics then use these myths as a ba-
sis for urging adoption of the rule in America. 271
party and to order additional payment out of legal aid fund if necessary to prevent hardship,
German legal aid rules leave parties to their own resources).
268. Rashi Fein, Health Care Reform, Sci. AM., Nov. 1992, at 46, 46 (contrasting health care
costs of different countries, including United States); Hillary Stout, A Radical Cure, WALL ST.J.,
Jan. 20, 1993, at R12 (comparing health care costs in United States with costs in 13 other
countries).
269. Fein, supra note 268, at 46; Stout, supra note 268, at R12; see Storer H. Rowley, Pre-
scription From Canada, CHi. TRIB., May 31, 1992, § 10 (Magazine), at 14 (examining differences
between Canadian and U.S. health care systems).
270. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement, supra note 15, at 792-93 (basing many conclu-
sions on single anecdotal experience); Greenberger, supra note 210, at 400-14 (assuming that
use of English Rule in United States would create same results in United States as in Eng-
land); Kuenzel, supra note 15, at 75 (conceding that conclusions are "more hypothetical than
'hard' research results"). Until a few recent studies, most commentators would use "logical"
arguments based on what they believe would or should occur if the two-way shift rule were
applied in the United States. See supra note 15 (presenting advocates of English Rule for
United States, though each author bases conclusions on conjecture rather than empirical evi-
dence). The only other alternative was application of theoretical mathematical models under
economic theories; however, these models made several assumptions, such as risk neutrality
between the parties. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testa-
ble Model of Strategic Behavior, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 227-47 (1982) (comparing American and
English rules and applying economic analysis to determine likelihood that parties will go to
trial); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 284-93 (1973)
(creating framework for "dealing with economics of risky conflicts" and applying to litigation
context); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure andJudicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417 n.28, 420-29, 437-41 (1973) (applying economic theory to reim-
bursement of attorney's fees and considering impact of costs on litigation).
271. For example, the assumption that the English Rule system gives superior compensa-
tion than the American Rule system is believed by the British and accepted by some commen-
tators in the United States. See supra note 15 (citing advocates of applying English Rule in
United States). This assumption, however, still ignores the overall operation of the British
system in compensating injured parties, as Professor Genn's study reveals. See infra notes
300-90 and accompanying text (describing Genn's study of personal injury lawsuits in
England).
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The following discussion is a brief examination of the loser-pays
rule in England and Australia. The discussion will not afford an ex-
tensive examination of the cultural, political, and social qualities
that affect these nations' cost-shifting rules as would be called for in
a comparative law study. Such a study would take years and result in
volumes of information. The more narrow purpose of this discus-
sion is to illustrate only two factors that have been either totally or
partially ignored by others. These two factors are settlements and
legal aid. Even this examination is incomplete and calls for addi-
tional study.
England has been selected for examination for two reasons. First,
most critics of the American Rule focus on England. 272 Second,
Professor Hazel Genn has published her empirical study of English
settlement practices.273 Australia has been selected as a contrast to
England concerning the effect of legal aid on the loser-pays rule.
Although this review is limited to the effects of settlements and legal
aid, it provides a glimpse at several other aspects of cost shifting,
such as attempts by solicitors in England to avoid the negative influ-
ence of the two-way shift rule, the reality of the "assumed benefits"
of compensation, and increased access for small claims and poor
litigants.
B. England
Personal injury litigation in England is based on negligence. 274
Contributory negligence is not a complete defense; it only reduces
the recoverable amount by the plaintiff's percentage of fault in the
same manner as "pure" comparative fault in the United States. 275
The plaintiff commences suit by service of a writ or summons. 27 6
The defendant responds with an acknowledgement of service. 277
After the parties exchange initial pleadings that define the action,
272. See supra note 211 (listing articles that compare English and U.S. procedures).
273. HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING OUT OF COURT SETrLEMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY Ac-
TIONS (1987).
274. Id, at 3. This statement is a generalization about most personal injury actions in
England. There are, of course, several exceptions, including a new statute on consumer pro-
tection. See Geraint Howells, United Kingdom's Consumer Protection Act 1987-The Implementation
of the E.C. Directive on Product Liability, 1987 EUR. CONSUMER LJ. 159, 160 (examining changes
in English consumer protection law and concluding that negligence generally remains basis of
manufacturer liability).
275. See GENN, supra note 273, at 29-30 (comparing rules of contributory and comparative
negligence in United States and England); see also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 242-
69 (7th ed. 1987) (providing analysis of law of contributory negligence and voluntary assump-
tion of risk in United States).
276. GENN, supra note 273, at 9.
277. GENN, supra note 273, at 8-10.
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discovery may commence. 278 There are two categories of docu-
ments: those produced without objection that may be inspected by
the opponent, and those considered privileged and thus not subject
to inspection.279 The discoverable documents in the first category
usually consist of routine items such as medical records and physi-
cians' reports. 28 0 Parties exchange expert witness reports before
trial.281
Beyond the exchange of documents and expert reports, little
other discovery is allowed. Parties do not exchange witnesses'
names and addresses. 282 Pretrial discovery by depositions, interrog-
atories, and production of documents, all familiar practices to U.S.
practitioners, are unknown in England. 283 There is no pretrial ex-
amination of any witness. 28 4 There is no right to depose any party
to the litigation.285 Although limited interrogatories of a party op-
ponent are allowed, the procedure is seldom used because it is dis-
couraged by penalties of costs, including attorney's fees. 28 6 These
costs can be assessed against a party who cannot prove that inter-
rogatories are the only manner in which the evidence can be ob-
tained, or that interrogatories are less expensive than other
discovery methods. 28 7 The English system allows the "parties to
proceed to trial on potentially erroneous assumptions about the
strength or weakness of the opponent's case."'288
Between the close of pleadings and the time of trial, the defend-
ant may use an interlocutory procedure known as "paying into
court" or "payment in," 28 9 a practice similar to an offer ofjudgment
278. GENN, supra note 273, at 9.
279. GENN, supra note 273, at 9; Theodore R. Tetzlaff, Opening Statement: The English Rule
from the English Perspective, LnTG., Summer 1992, at 1, 58.
280. GENN, supra note 273, at 32.
281. Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 59; see MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 97 (5th ed. 1988) (stating that automatic disclosure of expert evidence
is normally required within 10 weeks of close of pleadings in personal injury cases).
282. GENN, supra note 273, at 9; ZANDER, supra note 281, at 88 (describing how discovery
procedures apply to witnesses).
283. See GENN, supra note 273, at 9-10 (depicting British system as "trial by ambush," and
noting that only procedure for obtaining information is by use of interrogatories, with permis-
sion required by trial master); ZANDER, supra note 281, at 86 (explaining restricted use of
interrogatories). These interrogatories are used infrequently because masters interpret prac-
tice narrowly. GENN, supra note 273, at 10.
284. GENN, supra note 273, at 9; Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 59.
285. GENN, supra note 273, at 9-10.
286. GENN, supra note 273, at 9-10.
287. Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 59.
288. GENN, supra note 273, at 32.
289. GENN, supra note 273, at 10; see Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 58 (concluding that this
procedure is "real advantage" of English Rule).
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under rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.290 If the in-
jured party decides to reject the offer and the trial award is less than
the offer, the plaintiff is deprived of any recovery of costs, including
attorney's fees, incurred after the "payment in." 291
Judges, not juries, try personal injury actions. 292 If the action
goes to trial, barristers represent the parties. 293 A solicitor handles
all legal matters prior to the trial. 294 The solicitor makes the initial
contact with an injured party or defendant, initiates the investiga-
tion, and conducts the pleadings and discovery. 295 For cases that go
to trial, the solicitor also contacts a barrister.296 Barristers engaged
by the injured party's solicitor do not routinely see or speak to the
plaintiff.297 In addition, a code of conduct precludes barristers from
seeing witnesses. 298 Barristers depend almost solely on the brief
and instructions prepared by the solicitor for trial.299
1. Hard bargaining
In 1987, Professor Hazel Genn published the results of her metic-
ulous study of English practice in settlement of personal injury ac-
tions. Her book, entitled Hard Bargaining,300 is necessary reading
for anyone concerned with fee-shifting rules. The results of her
study focus on settlements, but the results cast a great deal of doubt
on the "anecdotes" and "logical assumptions" used by several com-
mentators who propose the adoption of a loser-pays rule in the
United States.30 1 The following section attempts to give a short sy-
290. FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (governing procedures for offers ofjudgment that, inter alia, allow
defending party to submit to adverse party offer of money or property to settle claim).
291. GENN, supra note 273, at 10; Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 58.
292. See Tetzlaff, supra note 279, at 1-2 (stating that trial by jury has been virtually abol-
ished in English civil law and noting that juries are used only for cases of malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, and defamation).
293. See ALBERT K. R. KiRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 288-91 (8th ed. 1990) (ex-
plaining that legal profession in England is divided into two branches: barristers, who plead
cases in superior courts, and solicitors, who conduct legal negotiations for clients, prepare
cases for trial, and draw up wills and other formal legal documents). Solicitors may have
audiences in country courts and magistrates courts, before masters, and registrars of the High
Court. Id. at 289.
294. Id. at 288-89.
295. See id. at 290 (explaining that barristers may not seek clients directly or advertize and
depend on solicitors to supply them with clients); cf GENN, supra note 273, at 61 (asserting
that it is solicitor's role to construct case, including early stages of investigation, interviewing
witnesses, and obtaining experts' reports).
296. KiRALFY, supra note 293, at 290; cf. Goodhart, supra note 15, at 856 n.38 (describing
functions of solicitors and barristers).
297. GENN, supra note 273, at 71.
298. GENN, supra note 273, at 98.
299. GENN, supra note 273, at 70-71.
300. GENN, supra note 273.
301. See supra note 15 (presenting advocates' arguments for applying English Rule in
United States).
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nopsis of Professor Genn's work as it relates to the fee-shifting
issue.
a. The parties
Injured people, viewed as a group, are inexperienced in all as-
pects of formal and informal legal proceedings.3 02 They are a heter-
ogeneous group of "one shot players" as described by Professor
Galanter.303 It is a matter of chance whom a plaintiff chooses as
solicitor and whether that solicitor has any experience or expertise
in personal injury cases.30 4
Defendants, on the other hand, are a relatively homogeneous
group, consisting of entities such as corporations, governments, or
insurance companies. Defendants as a group are the "repeat play-
ers" described by Professor Galanter.s0 5 These repeat players have
a great deal of experience in negotiating and litigating cases.30
They choose a solicitor based on knowledge and expertise, and the
solicitors they choose are almost always experts in personal injury
matters.30 7 Defendants have the wealth, knowledge, and resources
to investigate and prepare a case for trial.3 0 8 Thus, a severe struc-
tural imbalance exists between plaintiffs and defendants.30 9
The approach to settlement by plaintiffs' solicitors is either "com-
bative" or "cooperative." 10 Solicitors with experience or expertise
in personal injury cases usually take the combative approach.3 11
The vast majority of solicitors, usually with little experience in per-
sonal injury, take the cooperative approach and attempt to resolve
302. GENN, supra note 273, at 36, 163-64.
303. See GENN, supra note 273, at 5-15, 34-35, 50-53, 81-82, 163-69 (applying Professor
Galanter's terms to English legal system); supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text (defining
terms "one shot players" and "repeat players").
304. See GENN, supra note 273, at 36 ("The manner in which personal injury plaintiffs
select or alight upon one firm of solicitors rather than another is often fortuitous. They may
simply go to the person who does their conveyancing; or if they have never used a solicitor
before, they may walk into a firm with a shop front; ask a friend; or use any other means.")
(citations omitted).
305. See GENN, supra note 273, at 5-15, 34-35, 50-53, 163-69 (using term "repeat play-
ers"); supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text (describing "repeat players").
306. GENN, supra note 273, at 34-35.
307. GENN, supra note 273, at 53.
308. GENN, supra note 273, at 34, 53.
309. See GENN, supra note 273, at 34 (explaining power imbalance between parties in terms
of Professor Galanter's "one shotter" and "repeat player" and noting that in most cases,
plaintiff is in weaker "one shotter" position).
310. GENN, supra note 273, at 46-50. Genn characterizes "cooperative" negotiators as
concerned about ethics, meeting clients' needs, and maintaining good relations with opposing
counsel and "competitive" or "combative" negotiators as "dominating, competitive, forceful.
tough, arrogant, and uncooperative." Id.
311. See GENN, supra note 273, at 43-44 (analyzing postal survey and concluding that spe-
cialists are more likely to agree with statements stressing combative approach).
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cases by negotiation.3 12 With rare exceptions, plaintiffs' solicitors
attempt to avoid trial if possible. 313 The cooperative approach,
which is fostered by defendants,31 4 creates an appearance that the
parties are meeting on equal terms to negotiate; the two sides, how-
ever, meet on terms that are utterly unequal.3 15 Cooperation does
not mean courteous or pleasant manners; it means that the plain-
tiff's solicitor will delay formal proceedings to avoid antagonizing
the defendant.3 16 Defendants, for their part, adopt an uncompro-
mising approach to settlement and take advantage of every opportu-
nity to minimize or avoid plaintiff's claim.3 17
b. Preparation
Plaintiffs must gather reliable evidence and seek the advice of ex-
perts to prove their claim. Plaintiffs, however, are greatly disadvan-
taged in the process. They are usually not in a position to gather
"fresh evidence" immediately after an accident. 318 An injured party
is more likely to be worried about recovery from injuries than col-
lecting evidence for a future claim.3 19 In addition, plaintiffs are less
likely than defendants to have resources to pay for investigation and
experts. 320
Insurance companies, for example, place a high priority on the
collection of facts immediately after an accident.3 21 They are able to
place almost unlimited resources into gathering information and
will expend considerable sums on investigation and experts. 322 In
contrast, the relative unprofitability of litigation induces plaintiffs
and their solicitors to forgo or delay necessary investigation.3 23
312. See GENN, supra note 273, at 43-44 (finding that nonspecialists focus on "reasonable"
approach).
313. See GENN, supra note 273, at 44 (displaying results of survey showing that 85%o of
specialists and 917o of nonspecialists agreed with statement that "most solicitors prefer to
settle out of court," and 18%7 of specialists and 35%o of nonspecialists agreed with statement
that "going to court is last resort in personal injury litigation").
314. GENN, supra note 273, at 49.
315. See GENN, supra note 273, at 163-69 (concluding that plaintiff is disadvantaged from
start due to solicitor's lack of expertise, structural conflicts relating to costs, and plaintiff's
uncertainty).
316. GENN, supra note 273, at 166.
317. GENN, supra note 273, at 103-08.
318. GENN, supra note 273, at 81-82.
319. GENN, supra note 273, at 66-67. Plaintiffs are normally "whisked away from the scene
[of an accident] pretty quickly" while defendants normally have access to important evidence
and testimony. Id.
320. GENN, supra note 273, at 81.
321. GENN, supra note 273, at 82.
322. GENN, supra note 273, at 82 (noting that insurance companies recognize importance
of high quality evidence in preparing for both trials and negotiations in order to achieve best
possible settlements).
323. GENN, supra note 273, at 82.
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This imbalance in information and resources leads plaintiffs to ne-
gotiate from a weak position.324
c. Legal costs
In England, costs include all legal expenses incurred in the prepa-
ration and conclusion of a case.3 25 These costs include the legal
fees charged by the solicitor and barrister. 326 With rare .exceptions,
legal fees constitute the lion's share of the costs.3 27 The costs
charged to the client, however, might not be the same costs col-
lected from a losing party.
d. Solicitor/client
Amounts that a solicitor would normally charge his or her client
for the preparation of the case are called solicitor and own client
costs or solicitor/client costs. 32 8 These costs are what the client
agrees to pay on the case. 329
e. Party/party
Party and party, or party/party, are those costs that are consid-
ered absolutely necessary to enforce or defend a claim.330 They
generally do not cover all expenses of litigation and average about
two-thirds of the solicitor/client costs. 33 1 If a case goes to trial, the
winner normally receives party and party costs.3 3 2 If the case set-
tles, the amount of costs is open to negotiations, with the plaintiff's
solicitor attempting to obtain solicitor/client costs and the defend-
ant arguing for party and party costs. 333
2. Financing
A plaintiff has three major sources of financing: private, legal aid,
and trade union.33 4 These sources are addressed below.
324. GENN, supra note 273, at 82 (adding that there is reduced chance of imbalance where
"amount of damages at stake is very high").
325. RONALDJ. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 219 (4th ed. 1976).
326. Id. at 219, 227-28.
327. Telephone Interview with Simon K. Walton, Partner, Robin Thompson & Partners,
Solicitors (May 12, 1993).
328. RICHARD M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 420 (6th ed. 1972).
329. See GENN, supra note 273, at 84 (noting that costs can be expressly or implicitly ap-
proved by client).
330. GENN, supra note 273, at 34.
331. See GENN, supra note 273, at 34 (stating that this award is "least generous" available
and is limited to amount necessary to attain justice).
332. GENN, supra note 273, at 34.
333. GENN, supra note 273, at 34.
334. GENN, supra note 273, at 85.
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a. Private
An injured party must pay for all legal expenses (costs) as they are
incurred. These expenses include attorney's fees, cost of investiga-
tion, cost of hiring experts, and all costs incidental to completing
the case.335 Contingent fee arrangements used in the United States
are prohibited in England.33 6 Some solicitors will undertake a pri-
vately funded case on "spec." 33 7 This arrangement is a verbal
agreement whereby the solicitor agrees to delay the payment of fees
until the conclusion of the case. 338 Only cases with a very high
probability of success are taken on spec. 339 But even then, the in-
jured person must pay for other expenses of case preparation.3 40
The spec arrangement is a very delicate one for the solicitor because
the rules of professional conduct do not permit any assurances to a
client about nonpayment of costs.3 41 If a judge learns of a spec ar-
rangement, he or she can deny a successful litigant recovery of fees
from the loser. 342
b. Legal aid
Legal aid is available in personal injury actions. 343 Such aid is
available to over fifty percent of the English population, and even a
person with a family earning as much as $45,000 a year can qual-
ify.344 The ready availability of legal aid in England is in stark con-
trast to the U.S. system, where only the very poor can obtain legal
aid. In the United States, the maximum annual income level for in-
dividuals who can qualify for legal aid is $7212, and for a member of
a family of four to qualify, that family cannot earn over $14,562.345
Under the present program in the United States, legal aid is denied
altogether to a personal injury victim, no matter how poor.3 46
335. GENN, supra note 273, at 85.
336. See GENN, supra note 273, at 31 (noting however that evidence of "informal" contin-
gency agreements does exist).
337. Telephone Interview with Simon K. Walton, Partner, Robin Thompson & Partners,
Solicitors (Jan. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Interview with Walton] (notes on file with The American
University Law Review).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.; cf. GENN, supra note 273, at 111 (stating that privately funded plaintiffs place
solicitor at risk because if there is loss, solicitor will have to look to plaintiff for fees, and
plaintiffs have limited resources).
342. GENN, supra note 273, at 117; Interview with Walton, supra note 337.
343. GENN, supra note 273, at 87-88.
344. Cornwall, supra note 1, at 1.
345. See Marianne W. Young, Note, The Need for Legal Aid Reform: A Comparison of English
and American Legal Aid, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 379, 396 (1991) (comparing limited availability
of legal aid in United States with greater availability of legal aid in England).
346. Id. at 395 n.126 (noting that legal aid for personal injury actions is not permitted
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Once a person qualifies for legal aid in England,3 47 all costs are
paid for the necessary conclusion of the case.3 48 These costs in-
clude the cost of conducting an investigation and other necessary
expenditures.3 49 The injured party selects the solicitor, and legal
aid pays for all legal fees for the solicitor and barrister.35 0 If the
injured person succeeds, the defendant will have to pay the costs
paid by legal aid on a party-and-party basis.3 51 If the defendant
wins, however, neither the injured party nor legal aid has to pay the
defendant's costs. 3 52 By obtaining legal aid, the injured party is free
of any costs, win or lose.3 5 3 Under such circumstances, the two-way
shift is, in effect, changed to a one-way shift in favor of plaintiffs.
c. Trade union
If a trade union undertakes a case on behalf of the injured person,
it will pay for all legal costs. 354 This coverage includes all legal fees
and other necessary expenses.3 55 Should the injured party win,
such costs are recoverable from the defendant on a party and party
basis.356 If the injured party loses, the trade union will pay all costs
that the defendant is entitled to recover.35 7 Thus, the injured party
is freed of any costs, win or lose.3 58 Although these cases generally
retain the two-way shift rule, the trade unions may be exposed to the
costs that are paid to the winning defendant while the losing plain-
tiff pays nothing. The injured party, in a practical sense, has the
benefit of a one-way shift under the two-way shift system.
When a plaintiff uses private funding, which occurs more than
"because the potential damage awards would take fees away from private lawyers willing to
work on a contingency basis").
347. See GENN, supra note 273, at 87 (discussing process of determining availability of legal
aid for particular plaintiffs).
348. GENN, supra note 273, at 87. Genn adds that "[i]f the income and capital of an appli-
cant are below certain limits, he [or she] is entitled to legal aid without any contribution." Id.
If a plaintiff's means are between the bottom limit of no contribution and the top limit of no
eligibility for legal aid, then the plaintiff will be required to make a contribution toward legal
expenses. Id
349. GENN, supra note 273, at 88.
350. GENN, supra note 273, at 87-95.
351. GENN, supra note 273, at 89.
352. GENN, supra note 273, at 89.
353. GENN, supra note 273, at 90-91. Although the legally aided losing plaintiff is, in prin-
ciple, required to pay the winning defendant's legal expenses on a party/party basis up to a
reasonable amount, courts will not find it reasonable to force the plaintiff to pay any costs of
defendant's insurance company. Id.
354. GENN, supra note 273, at 85.
355. GENN, supra note 273, at 85-86, 113.
356. GENN, supra note 273, at 85-86.
357. GENN, supra note 273, at 110.
358. See GENN, supra note 273, at 85-86 (suggesting that trade union backing also in-
creases strength of both plaintiff and plaintiff's solicitor because neither has fear of financial
difficulties in pursuing litigation).
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fifty percent of the time,3 59 the plaintiff risks not only having to pay
all costs personally incurred, but also having to pay the costs of the
defendant.3 60 Thus, the plaintiff has an incentive to seek legal aid or
trade union representation, if possible. This fact might create a
conflict of interest between the solicitor and the injured party; most
solicitors avoid legal aid because of increased paperwork, reduced
income, and perceived time delays.3 6 1
3. Bargaining
Litigation deters injured people from filing personal injury suits,
and most plaintiffs will substantially compromise their claim to
avoid the unpleasant experience of trial.3 62 The primary pressures
on the parties to settle result from the uncertainties about liability,
the amount of damages, the effects of delay and costs, and what will
occur at trial.3 63 The longer a case is delayed, the more the injured
party becomes anxious and discouraged.364 While insurance com-
panies vehemently deny any deliberate use of delaying tactics as part
of their strategy, it is clear that they do in fact use delay as a potent
weapon against plaintiffs.3 65 Although defendants create or contrib-
ute to delay, they are relatively insulated from any of the adverse
effects of delay.3 66 Delay is built into the procedural rules of litiga-
tion, and defendants use delay to their advantage.3 67 Furthermore,
the cooperative approach of plaintiffs' solicitors works to the de-
fendants' advantage because it promotes delay.3 68
Although costs may accumulate for both parties when a case is
delayed, insurance companies retain the money that they might have
to pay in a settlement and earn more interest than they would save
by paying plaintiffs.3 69 Delay is a successful tactic for defendants
because the outcomes caused by delay are not limited to settlement
359. GENN, supra note 273, at 110.
360. GENN, supra note 273, at 110-11.
361. GENN, supra note 273, at 87-95.
362. See GENN, supra note 273, at 98 (noting plaintiff's fear of appearing in English High
Court as disincentive to pursuing litigation).
363. GENN, supra note 273, at 99.
364. See GENN, supra note 273, at 99, 123 (discussing strong pressures on parties to arrive
at negotiated settlement while litigation continues).
365. See GENN, supra note 273, at 100-07 (adding that delay can effectively force settlement
when plaintiff needs recovery for "past and continuing losses," and when solicitor wants re-
covery to pay for services rendered).
366. See GENN, supra note 273, at 103-04 (suggesting that ability to earn interest on funds
during delay and possibility of claim withdrawal make delay better alternative for insurance
companies).
367. GENN, supra note 273, at 102-07.
368. GENN, supra note 273, at 103-04, 164-67.
369. See GENN, supra note 273, at 104 & n.2 (noting that usual interest rate for general
damage is only 2%).
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or trial. The plaintiff may give up altogether without any settlement,
a result that occurs in one-sixth of all claims.370
Uncertainty about costs is one of the primary concerns of the
plaintiff. If a privately financed plaintiff loses, then she must pay for
both her own costs and the defendant's costs.3 7 1 Payment of these
costs is an awesome prospect because the legal expenses for both
sides will total from thirty to sixty percent of the amount of damages
obtained in settlement.3 72 An injured party's risk is not only the
failure to obtain damages for an injury, but also the payment of
"double costs" in the event of a loss.3 7 3 Even if the plaintiff aban-
dons the case with no settlement, she remains responsible for her
solicitor's costs and may be liable for the full trial cost.3 74
Uncertainty, delay, and fear of payment of costs have placed tre-
mendous pressures on the injured party to settle. When an injured
person rejects the first settlement offer made by a defendant, the
amount of the second offer averages between one-third and one-half
more than the first.3 75 If the plaintiff rejects the second offer, the
third offer averages about one-third greater than the second of-
fer.376 But the pressure on injured parties to settle is so great that
two-thirds of the injured parties who settle out of court accept the
first offer made by the defendant.3 77
Professor Genn aptly describes the pressures applied to injured
people:
Creating or maintaining uncertainty about these issues, by legiti-
mate use of available procedures, is clearly in the defendant's in-
terest. First, it has the effect of reducing the likelihood that the
plaintiff will be prepared to go to trial at all; second, it increases
the likelihood that the plaintiff will accept an offer of settlement;
and third, it provides the justification for making a reduced offer
on the grounds that the plaintiff has been spared the delay and
uncertainty of protracted litigation.
•.. A considerable proportion of the stress induced in plaintiffs
is a product of deliberate strategy and the inability of plaintiffs'
solicitors, for reasons of resources, organization, and experience,
370. See GENN, supra note 273, at 104 (noting that plaintiff might abandon claim at any
time for fear of cost from losing or difficulty of finding evidence).
371. GENN, supra note 273, at 109.
372. GENN, supra note 273, at 109.
373. See GENN, supra note 273, at 109 (stressing that losing plaintiff will be required to pay
own solicitor's fees and opponent's solicitor's fees).
374. GENN, supra note 273, at 109.
375. GENN, supra note 273, at 106.
376. GENN, supra note 273, at 106-07.
377. GENN, supra note 273, at 106-07.
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to insulate clients from its effects. There is a self-serving tautol-
ogy or circularity in the arguments which assert the advantages for
plaintiffs of settling their claims out of court. The plaintiff is ad-
vised to accept a discounted offer because he has been spared the
stress of continued litigation-stress which the defendant deliber-
ately exacerbates because it is in his interests to do so, because by
so doing he can pressure the plaintiff into settling cheaply.378
When an injured person is represented by a trade union or legal
aid, however, a portion of the pressures on the injured party is re-
duced. Although the plaintiff might have many of the same fears
and uncertainties about the case as a privately funded plaintiff, the
monetary risks have been removed.379 In such situations, defend-
ants regard the injured parties and their solicitors as formidable op-
ponents.380 Insurance companies are well aware that injured parties
represented by trade unions are operating on a more equal basis
than privately funded plaintiffs.38 l In such instances, insurance
companies cannot rely on the fear of prohibitive costs as a means of
forcing plaintiffs to settle.382
4. Payment in
The defendant who believes that the plaintiff will succeed in es-
tablishing_ liability will offer into court a reduced amount, called a
"payment in," of what the defendant calculates as full damages.383
If the plaintiff accepts this reduced amount, the case is settled.
38 4 If
the plaintiff rejects the amount paid in, and the plaintiff is awarded
an amount equal to or less than that amount at trial, then the plain-
tiff will have to pay the defendant's costs incurred after the payment
in.3 8 5 Such costs can amount to a great deal of money because the
trial may entail considerable expense. Thus, the payment in
presents an additional theoretical weapon available to insurance
companies to increase pressure on injured parties. Genn concludes
378. GENN, supra note 273, at 122-23.
379. See GENN, supra note 273, at 113 (noting that plaintiff represented by legal aid or
trade union will not have to pay costs regardless of outcome of claim);see also supra notes 343-
58 (reviewing procedures involving legal aid and trade union and resulting psychological ef-
fect on plaintiffs).
380. See GENN, supra note 273, at 113 (noting that balance of power has shifted because of
trade union's resources and solicitor's expertise).
381. See GENN, supra note 273, at 113 (noting inability of insurance companies to use trial
as threat in trade union cases and fact that trade union solicitors are highly experienced).
382. See GENN, supra note 273, at 113 (noting that possibility of going to trial will not deter
union-backed plaintiff and solicitor from pursuing claim).
383. GENN, supra note 273, at 10.
384. See GENN, supra note 273, at 10 (stressing that losing plaintiff will be required to pay
own solicitor's fees and opponent's solicitor's fees).
385. GENN, supra note 273, at 111.
16111993]
1612 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that such pressures were especially heavy on privately funded
plaintiffs.386
5. Conclusion
In England, approximately ninety-nine percent of all claims for
damages are settled before trial.38 7 The settlement of all but one
percent of claims does assist the civil justice system by freeing con-
gested courts for other matters and "smoothing" the administration
of civil matters.388 Professor Genn noted, however, that the settle-
ments are one-sided in favor of defendants: "The legal rules of evi-
dence and procedure... can be mobilized efficiently against faint-
hearted plaintiffs and their solicitors to delay claims, to increase the
likelihood of abandonment, to reduce the likelihood of trial, and to
encourage capitulation on the basis of discounted and reduced of-
fers."3 8 9 Ultimately, Professor Genn concluded:
In modem times, the deterrent and retributive effects of the law
have been considerably blunted by the pervasiveness of insurance,
and it seems reasonable to assume that compensation to injured
people, or the allocation of losses, is a major objective of English
tort law. This objective is not satisfied merely by the provision of
"some" compensation, but by the provision of adequate
compensation.
The principle of restitutio in integrum implies full compensation
for losses suffered and incorporates the practical policy objective
of reducing the potential burden of injury victims on others. It
also carries with it a moral concept ofjustice being done between
the parties. Justice should not be contingent on the financial or
other resources available to the parties. The rules of negligence
are based on principles of conduct to which questions of differen-
tial resources are largely irrelevant. Similarly, the rules for the
assessment of damages are related to actual losses consequent on
injuries suffered. In court the determination of these matters
should be uninfluenced by the relative resources available to the
parties.
An assumption that out of court settlements simply reflect the
outcome that would have occurred at trial, but without the inevita-
ble delay and expense of formal proceedings, ignores what this
study has shown to be the crucial importance of unequal re-
sources and opportunities, and other extra-legal factors, which
386. GENN, supra note 273, at 111.
387. GENN, supra note 273, at 168.
388. GENN, supra note 273, at 167.
389. GENN, supra note 273, at 169.
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may exert a greater influence outside the courtroom than
inside .... 390
C. Australia
The Australian legal system provides an excellent comparison to
the English method of applying the loser-pays rule.391 The Austra-
lian practice is identical in most respects to the English practice.
The solicitor/client method of determining costs in England is the
same as the winners' collection of costs on a party and party basis in
Australia.3 92 One significant difference, however, is the availability
of legal aid. Legal aid in Australia was largely unavailable in the
past and is now almost unavailable in a personal injury case.3 9 3 Ad-
ditionally, a solicitor's practice in Australia differs somewhat from a
solicitor's practice in England.
1. Small claims
The practical unavailability of legal aid in Australia presents some
insight into the proposition that a two-way shift allows greater ac-
cess to the courts for a small claim than a nonshifting rule. When a
person with a small claim visits a solicitor in Australia, the fee ar-
rangement is made on a cash basis. The claimant must pay for all
legal costs, including the solicitor's fees, as they are incurred.39 4
When presented with a potential client who has a small claim, the
solicitor will estimate the legal costs; the claimant can then decide
whether to pursue the claim.39 5 A solicitor will not undertake a
390. GENN, supra note 273, at 168-69.
391. The following portion of this Article is based on personal experience while teaching
and visiting with many solicitors and barristers in Australia. To confirm these personal exper-
iences, the author conducted telephone interviews with professors, solicitors, and barristers in
Australia.
392. Telephone Interview with Peter Cashman, Solicitor, Cashman & Partners (Feb. 9,
1993) [hereinafter Interview with Cashman] (notes on file with The American University Law
Review); Telephone Interview with Rob Davis, Solicitor, Attwood Marshall Solicitors (Feb. 5,
1993) [hereinafter Interview with Davis] (notes on file with The American University Law Review).
Both Peter Cashman and Rob Davis agree that the amounts collectible from an opponent
under the party/party costs are between one-half and two-thirds of the amounts charged a
client under solicitor/client costs. Interview with Cashman, supra; Interview with Davis, supra.
393. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Telephone Interviews with Julie Cassidy,
Professor, Deakin University School of Law (Dec. 12, 1992; Jan. 5, 21, 1993; Feb. 14, 1993)
[hereinafter Interviews with Cassidy] (notes on file with The American University Law Review);
Interview with Davis, supra note 392; Telephone Interviews with Ray Osborne, Barrister (Dec.
2, 1992; Jan. 29, 1993; Feb. 14, 21 (1993)) [hereinafter Interviews with Osborne] (notes on
file with The American University Law Review). Legal aid is now becoming unavailable to any
personal injury victim because of a legal aid policy of rejecting applicants in civil cases where
costs may be awarded. Letter from Legal Aid Office, Queensland, Australia, to Practitioners
(July 9, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review).
394. Interviews with Cassidy, supra note 393; Interviews with Osborne, supra note 393.
395. Interviews with Cassidy, supra note 393.
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small claims case where she will not recover costs and solicitor's fees
from the client and where she cannot collect from the losing
party.3 96 Further, the amounts collectible on a party/party basis are
far less than the amounts collectible from the client.39 7 Even when
the small claimant wins, the solicitor will demand the "short fall"
between the fees collected in party/party costs and the solicitor and
client costs.3 98 Both solicitors and clients view small claims as un-
profitable because most such cases involve costs that far exceed the
claimed amount. 399 The small claim winner thus loses because the
costs will almost always exceed the claim. This experience shows
that the opinion that a two-way shift provides greater access to jus-
tice than the no-shift rule is not borne out in practice. 400
396. Interview with Davis, supra note 392. Rob Davis said that when the case involves only
a few hundred dollars, especially noninjury cases, both clients and solicitors believe them to
be unprofitable. Id.
397. See supra note 392 and accompanying text (comparing party/party and solicitor/client
methods of determining costs).
398. Interview with Davis, supra note 392; Interview with Cashman, supra note 392.
399. Interviews with Osborne, supra note 393. All of the parties interviewed agreed that
the client normally pays both the fees and expenses (costs) as they are incurred. Interview
with Cashman, supra note 392; Interviews with Cassidy, supra note 393; Interview with Davis,
supra note 392; Interviews with Osborne, supra note 393.
400. Small claims jurisdiction in Australian provinces provides insight into cost shifting.
In Queensland, the Small Claims Tribunal Act 1973-85 provides jurisdiction for claims not
exceeding $5000 AU. Costs are not recoverable, and legal representation of a party is al-
lowed only under exceptional circumstances. Small Claims Tribunal Act 1973-85, § 4
(Queensland). The New South Wales Consumer Claims Tribunal Act of 1987 provides juris-
diction for claims with a maximum value of $3000 AU. Consumer Claims Tribunal Act 1987,
§ 3 (New South Wales). Furthermore, the statute does not permit costs awards, id. § 28, and
it bars legal representation of any party except in rare instances, subject to court approval. Id.
§ 21. In Victoria, the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1973 provides jurisdiction for claims not
exceeding $5000 AU. Small Claims Tribunals Act 1973, § 2 (Victoria). It does not award
costs to either party, id. § 33, and bars legal representation unless the parties agree or the
tribunal approves such representation. Id. § 30(b).
Additionally, in Western Australia the Small Claims Tribunals Act 1974 provides jurisdic-
tion for small claims up to $2000 AU. Small Claims Tribunals Act 1974, § 4 (Western Austra-
lia). Costs are allowed only under exceptional circumstances where injustice would otherwise
result. Id. § 35. Legal representation is not available unless both parties agree or the tribunal
approves the representation. Id § 32(3). In Tasmania, the Court of Request (Small Claims
Division) Act 1985 provides jurisdiction for claims not exceeding $2000 AU. Court of Re-
quest (Small Claims Division) Act 1985, Part I, § 3 (Tasmania). Costs are not allowed unless
the Special Commissioner determines that the claim is either frivolous or vexatious. Id.
§ 29(l)-(2). The Act also forbids legal representation unless both parties agree, or unless the
Special Commissioner allows it. Id. § 23(1), (3).
South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory do not pro-
vide small claims courts for consumers. These areas have modified court rules, however, so
that both businesses and consumers can take advantage of the small claims procedure. In
South Australia, the Magistrate Court Act 1991 provides jurisdiction for claims up to $5000
AU for tort, contract, and quasi-contract cases. Magistrate Court Act 1991, § 3 (South Austra-
lia); CHRISTOPHER WHELAN, SMALL CLAIMS COURT 63 (1990). Legal representation is not al-
lowed unless either all parties agree or the court orders it on the basis of equity. Magistrate
Court Act 1991, § 38(3)(a) (South Australia). Costs in South Australia normally are not
awarded. The two exceptions are if all parties are represented by counsel or if the court
believes that special circumstances justify the award of costs. Id. § 38(5).
In the Australian Capital Territory, the Small Claims Ordinance 1974 provides jurisdiction
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2. Indigent plaintiffs
In Australia, an indigent injured plaintiff presents a very interest-
ing contrast in fee-shifting rules. A potential client with serious in-
jury may have a solicitor take the case on "spec." 40 1 The solicitor
will investigate the facts; if the investigation reveals a strong chance
of recovery, then the case will be accepted on spec. On the other
hand, should the facts indicate that the case is not "very strong," the
client will be responsible for investigation expenses and can choose
whether to proceed on a pay-as-you-go basis, drop the matter, or
consult with another solicitor.402
If the case is accepted on spec, the solicitor's fees will not be paya-
ble immediately. Instead, the solicitor will record his time as the
case progresses without demanding payment.40 3 The costs of ex-
perts, investigation, and other expenses necessary for completion of
the case, however, are not usually paid by the solicitor.40 4 The indi-
gent client therefore cannot pay the necessary costs to prepare the
case. This dilemma is resolved by either advancing such expenses
or having the indigent client obtain a loan from a bank or some
other similar institution.40 5 In the expense loan, the solicitor or the
firm agrees to cosign a loan with the indigent client for the amounts
necessary to pay for the expenses, exclusive of the solicitor's fees. 40 6
for small claims up to $5000 AU. Small Claims Ordinance 1974, § 4(2) (Australian Capital
Territory). Costs are not allowed unless the court orders them because of special circum-
stances, and legal representation is not restricted. Id. § 29. Additionally, in the Northern
Territory the Small Claims Act 1991 provides jurisdiction for small claims not exceeding
$5000 AU. Small Claims Act 1991, § 5 (Northern Territory). Costs are allowed only in spe-
cial circumstances, and there is no restriction on legal representation. Id. § 29.
In sum, Australia applies the American Rule and does not shift costs in small claims cases.
The claimant may proceed on a small claim without representation and without fear of paying
the opponent's fee in the event of a loss. In the alternative, the small claimant may proceed
outside the small claims court and engage the services of the solicitor. In such instances,
however, the claimant will be responsible for payment of the solicitor's fees and the other
costs of litigation, including the opponent's costs in the event of a loss. See supra note 392 and
accompanying text (discussing similarity between Australian and English systems). For claims
that exceed the small claims jurisdictional amounts, the claimant operates under the two-way
shifting rule.
401. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Interviews with Osborne, supra note 393.
402. There is, of course, variation among solicitors as to what constitutes a "strong" case
acceptable on "spec." Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Interviews with Cassidy, supra
note 393, Interview with Davis, supra note 392.
403. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Interview with Davis, supra note 392.
404. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Interview with Davis, supra note 392.
405. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392. Rob Davis employs an "expense loan" or
"litigation loan," whereas Peter Cashman will usually advance the expenses directly. Inter-
view with Cashman, supra note 392; Interview with Davis, supra note 392. Such advances,
however, may or may not include all expenses. Depending on a number of factors, the
amounts advanced may be only a fraction of all expenses. Thus, some clients will undertake
responsibility for a portion of the expenses. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Inter-
view with Davis, supra note 392.
406. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392.
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If the injured party is successful, then the solicitor is able to collect
only a portion of all costs on a party/party basis. The amounts that
remain uncollected on a solicitor and client basis are obtained from
the injured person's damage award.40 7
An interesting situation occurs when the indigent client loses. In
such an event, the injured party's solicitor will be unable to collect
from the client because the client has no assets. If an expense loan
is used, the loaning institution will also be unable to collect from the
client; in this event, recovery will come from the solicitor who
cosigned for the loan. The winning defendant will, of" course, be
unable to collect costs from the indigent person. Thus, in such in-
stances, the Australian two-way shift effectively becomes a one-way
shift in the plaintiff's favor.
In sum, the transformation of a two-way shift rule into a one-way
shift in favor of the plaintiffs only assists injured parties who have
(1) no assets, (2) a severe injury, (3) a very strong case of liability,
and (4) the case accepted on spec. An indigent person who has a
severe injury and a good, but not strong, case of liability and who
cannot convince a solicitor to accept the case on spec will be left
without any remedy; the indigent person will be unable to pay for
the fees and other expenses necessary to prepare the case. The so-
licitor undertakes all the risks for the loss of his or her fees and the
repayment of the loan. From the solicitor's perspective, however, a
successful case may be profitable not only because of full collection
of fees but also because it is possible to collect a fee somewhat
larger than the normal solicitor's charges. 408
3. Middle class
The two-way shift also affects the middle class in Australia. If a
middle-class person sustains a less serious injury and cannot con-
vince a solicitor to take the case on spec, then the costs might ex-
ceed the value of the claim. If the claim has higher value, the
"double costs" in the event of a loss might exceed the value of the
claim. A risk-averse injured person may not wish to risk whatever
assets he or she has managed to accumulate. Even if the middle-
407. Interview with Cashman, supra note 392; Interview with Davis, supra note 392.
408. Under no circumstances might an increased amount be associated with a percentage
of the award. Any such agreement is prohibited because the solicitor may be able to obtain
fees that exceed those provided under the fee schedules. In other words, the solicitor may
obtain full fees as agreed on with the client. The solicitor will collect the difference between
those fees collected under a party/party costs system and the amounts the client receives in
compensation in the award. Interviews with Cashman, supra note 392; Interviews with Cas-
sidy, supra note 393; Interview with Davis, supra note 392; Interviews with Osborne, supra note
393.
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class person does have the case accepted on spec, the individual is in
an entirely different situation than the indigent person. Although
immediate costs are not payable to the solicitor, there remains the
possibility that, in the event of a loss, any accumulated assets could
be depleted by "double costs." The two-way shift does not change
into a one-way shift for the middle class, even when their case is
taken on spec.
V. THE AMERICAN PRACTICE AND THEORY
A. Contingent Fee System
In the United States, attorneys representing defendants in per-
sonal injury actions receive fees based on an hourly rate. The de-
fendants pay these fees and other legal costs as they are incurred.
In personal injury actions and other types of litigation, however,
plaintiffs' legal expenses are paid in a different manner. Plaintiffs
and their attorneys generally enter into contingent fee agreements
that provide for fees as a percentage, usually one-third, of the
amounts recovered in an action.40 9 If no recovery is obtained by
settlement or judgment, the plaintiff's attorney does not receive any
payment. The contingent fee agreement therefore places the risk of
loss on the attorney. When the plaintiff does recover, however, the
amount of recovery is reduced by the attorney's fees.4 10 Thus, the
risk-averse plaintiff is relieved of any financial worries that accom-
pany the immediate payment of attorney's fees in exchange for less
than full compensation after recovery of damages.4 1'
Legal fees are not the only legal expenses plaintiffs incur in per-
sonal injury actions. The costs of investigation, experts, deposi-
tions, and many other items used in preparing the case must be
paid.4 12 In complex or serious personal injury cases, these costs
might be massive.413 Thus, many seriously injured people may still
409. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 30 (1989) (discussing "standard one-third rate" of contin-
gency fee arrangement and suggesting new approach to determining appropriate rate).
410. See id. at 43 (remarking that contingent fee serves to limit "client's potential gain
[from litigation because of] ... the 'sale' of a percentage of the claim to the attorney").
411. See generally id. at 30-44 (discussing purpose and function of contingency fees in
United States); Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door,
LIG., Summer 1976, at 27, 28, 30 (explaining that contingency fee system permits access to
courts by those who otherwise would be unable to litigate); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen
Segerson, Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention, 20J. LEGAL
STUD. 381, 381-83, 398 (1991) (proposing method of economic analysis for evaluating contin-
gency fees and arguing that "contingent fees appear to have several beneficial effects on social
welfare").
412. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 348-49 & n.71 (noting varied fees personal
injury plaintiff must pay to litigate claim).
413. See 3JOHN F. VARGO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 42.06[5][a], at 42-56.15-
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be unable to undertake an action despite relief from the immediate
burden of paying attorney's fees. In most instances, however, plain-
tiffs' attorneys relieve their clients of this burden by "underwriting"
such costs on an "advanced payment" system.4 14 In this system, the
plaintiff's attorney pays for such advances during the course of the
litigation, and reimbursement is deferred until conclusion of the
case. 415 If the plaintiff prevails, the advanced costs can be paid from
the amounts recovered. 4 16 If the plaintiff loses, there is no fund
from which the advanced costs can be repaid.41 7 In theory, the in-
jured person remains liable for such costs; in practice the plaintiff's
attorney rarely, if ever, seeks payment.418 Thus, the injured party,
under the contingent fee/advanced payment system, is able to pur-
sue an action. The entire risk of legal expenses is borne by the
attorney.
The "repeat players" 419 and their supporters have criticized the
contingent fee/advanced payment system.420 This system, however,
enjoys wide popularity among injured plaintiffs who utilize it in
ninety-seven percent of personal injury cases.42 1 Such extensive use
of the system is probably a reflection of the fact that even if injured
people have adequate funds before an injury, those funds are often
seriously depleted because of the injury. In practice, the contingent
fee/advanced payment system provides access to justice for injured
.16 (1992) (giving several instances where advanced expenses totalled several hundreds of
thousands of dollars). For example, in recent tobacco litigation, the plaintiff's attorney in-
curred over $600,000 in expenses. Id at 42-46.15.
414. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 (noting that common practice of Califor-
nia personal injury attorneys is to accept responsibility for costs of trials for clients).
415. Cf. Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349-50 (noting fact that plaintiff attorneys can
"gamble on the chance of winning an occasional bigjudgment even if in the process they have
to invest in several losing trials").
416. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 n.71 (noting that attorney will receive
337 of settlement at or before pretrial conference and 40% of any later recovery).
417. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 n.71 (discussing fact that losing attorney
will not recover costs upon loss of case).
418. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 n.71 ("In practice, attorneys rarely at-
tempt to collect expenses from personal injury clients, both because it would be impractical
and because such practice might drive future clients away."). In the author's 19 years of prac-
tice, no unsuccessful personal injury client was charged for advanced expenses.
419. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text (comparing "repeat players" with
"one shot players").
420. See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, CURRENT ISSUES: CIVIL JUSTICE 21-29 (1984)
(arguing that regulation of contingent fee system is necessary because of potential for abuse);
cf. Glenn 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5, 22 ("Contingent fees have been the eternal nemesis of those
who consider themselves victims of aggressive lawyering.").
421. Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifling Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Im-
pact on Settlements Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2162 n.31 (1992) ("The contingency fee
system dominates most tort litigation in the United States today.").
ATTORNEY FEE ALLOCATION
people. In 1963, Judge Musmanno, expressing the need for such a
system, stated:
If it were not for contingent fees, indigent victims of tortious acci-
dents would be subject to the unbridled, self-willed partisanship
of their tortfeasors. The person who has, without fault on his
part, been injured and who, because of his injury, is unable to
work, and has a large family to support, and has no money to en-
gage a lawyer, would be at the mercy of the person who disabled
him because, being in a superior economic position, the injuring
person could force on his victim, desperately in need of money to
keep the candle of life burning in himself and his dependent ones,
a wholly unconscionably meager sum in settlement, or even refuse
to pay him anything at all. Any society, and especially a demo-
cratic one, worthy of respect in the spectrum of civilization,
should never tolerate such a victimization of the weak by the mighty.422
B. Recent Studies
Most analyses of competing fee-shifting systems have been based
on theory and supposition.423 Two recent studies conducted in Cal-
ifornia and Florida, however, have generated empirical data that
sheds light on the theoretical debate. Professors Gross and Syverud
conducted a study of settlement negotiations in 529 civil jury trials
over a one-year period in California.424 The California study's ex-
amination of the litigants' settlement behavior showed that the "re-
peat players," such as insurance companies, favored "hard
bargaining" tactics to influence injured plaintiffs and their attor-
neys.425 This "hard bargaining" appeared to be the same tactic
used by "repeat players" in England under a two-way shift.426 The
California study indicated that defendants might have attempted to
force injured plaintiffs to drop actions by driving up litigation costs,
even though the increased costs to defendants exceeded an amount
that plaintiffs would have accepted in settlement.427 Defendants
also seemed to attempt to generate risk in settlement negotiations
422. Richette v. Solomon, 187 A.2d 910, 919 (Pa. 1963) (emphasis added).
423. See supra note 15 (presenting authors who advocate adoption of English Rule).
424. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 330 (explaining that study was based on
nonrandom sampling of reports, contained in California weekly reporter, covering civil jury
trials that concluded between June 1985 and June 1986).
425. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 342-55 (discussing zero-offer and low-offer
cases).
426. See supra notes 300-33 and accompanying text (discussing use of "hard bargaining"
techniques in England).
427. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 343, 349 (explaining that personal injury
plaintiffs are not usually prepared to risk costs of litigation while defendants, such as insur-
ance companies, are ready to risk costs of litigation because they can spread costs over several
cases).
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to induce already risk-averse plaintiffs to accept settlements below
their claims' expected values. 428 In addition, defendants' use of
hard-bargaining tactics might have been an attempt to discourage
future litigation or set precedent that would discourage such litiga-
tion.429 Although the impact of defendants' behavior on plaintiffs
was reduced to some extent by the contingent fee/advanced ex-
pense system,430 plaintiffs' risk aversion remained so high that they
accepted settlement offers well below estimates of damages ex-
pected at trial. 43 ' Insurance companies seemed to systematically of-
fer only a fraction of the estimated value of a claim knowing that
most risk-averse plaintiffs are likely to accept a low-value settlement
rather than risk a chance of losing at trial. 43 2
The California study covered cases in which the American Rule
applied. Although the California study did not focus on the impact
of fee-shifting rules, it proves instructive when its results are consid-
ered in light of what is known about the English Rule's effect on
litigants' behavior. The English Rule deters claimants, especially
the economically disadvantaged, from pursuing litigation more than
the American Rule.43 3 The English Rule also escalates legal ex-
penses for those choosing to pursue litigation and can make settle-
ments less likely.43 4 Thus, if the English Rule were applied to the
cases in the California study, it would have exacerbated defendants'
use of hard bargaining tactics and increased the pressure on injured
plaintiffs.
In 1980, the Florida Medical Association (FMA) convinced the
Florida Legislature to adopt the English Rule by arguing that its ap-
plication would discourage the filing of low-merit claims, and that it
was not unjust to require the losing party to make the winner
428. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 343, 349, 352-55 (discussing impact of zero
offers and low offers on personal injury plaintiffs, who are generally unable to handle high
costs of litigation).
429. Cf. Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 352-53 (explaining that plaintiffs lose two-
thirds of cases in which they first do not receive settlement offers, but obtain sizeable judg-
ments in cases that they win).
430. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 349 (explaining that under contingent fee
system, costs are assumed by attorneys who often have greater resources than personal injury
plaintiffs and are more able to risk losing at trial given their involvement in numerous cases).
431. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 352-55 (discussing factors controlling plain-
tiffs' settlement behavior).
432. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 229, at 353 (explaining that insurance companies
benefit from policy of making low settlement offers because benefit of large number of low
settlements exceeds cost of paying large damages awards in few cases that are lost at trial).
433. See supra notes 362-82 and accompanying text (discussing bargaining rule in
England).
434. See infra note 493 and accompanying text (stating that law and economics scholars
have concluded that English Rule discourages settlement).
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whole.43 5 The Florida statute included a settlement procedure simi-
lar to the "payment in" procedure used in England.43 6 The statute,
however, exempted insolvent parties from the two-way shift
provision. 43 7
After the statute was implemented, several significant trends de-
veloped. Defendants' case expenditures increased,438 and plaintiffs
dropped more claims than they had under the American Rule.43 9 It
is not clear whether plaintiffs dropped more actions due to low
merit or due to increased risk aversion. 440 For claims that were not
dropped, settlement occurred more often.44 1 When claims were liti-
gated, defendants won most cases, although successful plaintiffs re-
covered both damages and attorney's fees. 44 2 Furthermore, some
judges awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees in amounts equal to their
contingent fee contracts.443 In these instances, judges appeared to
accomplish what proponents of the English Rule intended: to pro-
vide full compensation for the injured person. Any lesser fee award
would have obligated the successful plaintiff to pay his or her attor-
ney the difference between the full amount of a fee contract and the
smaller fee award.
One final significant development occurred under the Florida
statute. Successful insolvent plaintiffs received their attorney's fees
from defendants, but successful defendants could not recover their
attorney's fees from insolvent plaintiffs. 444 The Florida statute's
435. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 355-56 (stating that FMA's argument was
consistent with theoretical literature); Memorandum from Analyst to Director of Florida Sen-
ate Commerce Committee 2 (Apr. 29, 1980) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(arguing that justice requires making winner "whole").
436. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West 1984) (providing that "party who makes an offer
to allow judgment to be taken against him shall not be taxed for the prevailing party's attor-
ney's fees which accrue subsequent to such offer ofjudgment if the final judgment is not more
favorable to the prevailing party than the offer"), repealed by 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-175, § 43
(repeal effective Oct. 1, 1985); Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 n.24 (explaining that
Florida statute did not hold defendants liable for plaintiffs' attorney's fees incurred after
plaintiff rejected settlement offer that turned out to be greater than judgment).
437. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West 1984) (stating that "attorney's fees shall not be
awarded against a party who is insolvent or poverty-stricken"), repealed by 1985 Fla. Laws ch.
85-175, § 43 (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1985); see Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 (ex-
plaining that this provision did not benefit defendants and supporting argument that statute
only benefited plaintiffs).
438. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 370-77 (using mathematical analysis to assess
effect of English Rule on defense expenditures).
439. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 n.22, 367-70 (employing statistical analy-
sis to assess claim dispositions).
440. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 378.
441. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 365, 378 (stating that improvements in select-
ing claim at outset accounted for drop from 18% to 12% likelihood that claim would be
litigated).
442. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356.
443. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 & n.23.
444. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356.
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two-way shift rule was, in effect, converted into a one-way shift
favoring insolvent plaintiffs. 445 This result is identical to the effect
on English plaintiffs under legal aid.446
In the end, the FMA viewed the English system experience to be
so detrimental that it urged the statute's repeal. 447 The Florida Leg-
islature, complying with FMA's request, repealed the English Rule
statute in 1985.448 The Florida experience with the English Rule
and the FMA's response to its consequences are quite revealing.
Repeat players and their supporters are usually proponents of the
English Rule, arguing that full compensation for injured parties, es-
pecially those who cannot afford legal assistance, justifies adoption
of the rule.449 On the surface, this stance appears to champion the
rights of injured people and promote justice. The Florida medical
community's reaction, however, reveals that the greater motive un-
derlying the cry for adoption of the English Rule may be the reduc-
tion or elimination of all claims.
C. Alaska
Alaska has been proffered as a successful example of the English
Rule's application.450 Alaska, however, has a highly modified fee-
shifting system.451 When an Act of Congress first established Alaska
as a territory in 1900, Congress specified that a prevailing party's
judgment should include attorney's fees.452 This provision has sur-
vived Alaska's statehood and is presently incorporated in Alaska's
Rules of Civil Procedure as rule 82.4 53 Rule 82 sets forth a schedule
445. But see Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 n.25 (stating that it was not clear
whether two-way shift actually evolved into one-way shift favoring plaintiffs). While the stat-
ute as a whole might not have implemented a one-way shift, this provision became, in fact, a
one-way shift favoring insolvent plaintiffs.
446. See supra notes 343-53 and accompanying text (discussing system of legal aid in
England).
447. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 58, at 356 (explaining that FMA requested repeal
after fee-shifting rule caused expensive losses on part of hospitals and doctors).
448. 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-175, § 43 (repeal effective Oct. 1, 1985).
449. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing compensation asjustifica-
tion for English Rule).
450. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees, supra note 15, at 647. But see Hughes, supra
note 58, at 129-30 (noting that Alaskan lawyers disfavor Alaska's use of English Rule).
451. See ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(a) (amended by Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118,
effectiveJuly 15, 1993) (establishing schedule to govern award of attorney's fees, but leaving
court discretion to depart from schedule); Hughes, supra note 58, at 145 (setting forth text of
statute and standards for determining amount of fees to be awarded).
452. Act ofJune 6, 1900, ch. 786, §§ 509-528, 31 Stat. 321, 415.18; see Hughes, supra note
58, at 143-44 (explaining that this provision remained in Alaska's territorial statutes through
several reorganizations).
453. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(1) (amended by Alaska Supreme Court Order No, 1118,
effectiveJuly 15, 1993); see ALAsKA STAT. § 90.60.010 (1992) (granting Alaska Supreme Court
authority to determine costs to be awarded to prevailing party); see also Hughes, supra note 58,
at 144 (explaining evolution of current rule).
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of fees that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff, but leaves the
amount of fees that may be awarded to a successful defendant to the
court's discretion.454 The fee schedule for the plaintiff who receives
a favorable judgment is based on a decreasing scale according to the
amount awarded.455 The maximum amount recoverable in "con-
tested" matters is twenty percent of the first $25,000 and ten per-
cent thereafter.456 Rule 82 also establishes a graduated schedule for
cases "without trial," resolved after a motion but before trial, and
"non-contested" cases, or defaults. 457
The history of rule 82 practice in Alaska reveals a battleground
that prompted the Alaska Bar Association to call for the rule's re-
peal in 1974.458 At that time, James Blair, President of the Alaska
Bar Association, identified attorney's fees as "the single most ap-
pealed issue in civil cases in Alaska." 459 Although rule 82 practice
survived the Alaska Bar repeal request, the issue has recently caused
such concern that the rule has been redrafted.460
Rule 82 practice in Alaska is significant in several respects. When
negotiating a case, the plaintiff's attorney may argue that if the case
goes to trial, attorney's fees should be included in the award.461 De-
fendants, however, make offers of settlement in lump sums without
designating what portion of the offer is for the plaintiff's attorney's
454. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(1) (amended by Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118,
effective July 15, 1993).
455. Alaska's new rule 82, effectiveJuly 15, 1993, maintains the same fee schedule as the
earlier version of the rule.
Judgment and,
if Awarded,
Prejudgment Contested Contested
Interest with Trial Without Trial Noncontested
First $ 25,000 20% 18% 10%
Next $ 75,000 10% 8% 3%
Next $400,000 10% 6% 2%
Over $500,000 10% 2% 1%
Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See Hughes, supra note 58, at 147 & n.1 13 (explaining that objections to rule 82 cen-
tered on amount of discretion given to trial judge).
459. Hughes, supra note 58, at 145 (quotingJune 12, 1974 letter from president of Alaska
Bar Association).
460. See infra notes 487-89 and accompanying text (reviewing changes made to rule 82).
461. Telephone Interview with Dan A. Hensley, Luce& Hensley (Jan. 13, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Interview with Hensley] (notes on file with The American University Law Review); Telephone
Interview with James Parrish, Parrish Law Office (Feb. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Interview with
Parrish] (notes on file with The American University Law Review); Telephone Interview with Eric
Sanders, Young, Sanders & Feldman (Feb. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Interview with Sanders]
(notes on file with The American University Law Review).
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fees.462 From the plaintiff's view, the fee-shifting rule in settlement
negotiations has little effect.4 63 In large personal injury cases, the
fees recoverable after trial are only slightly larger than ten percent
of the compensation award.464 Thus, the recoverable fees are ap-
proximately one-third of what the plaintiff actually owes the attor-
ney.465 The remaining two-thirds of the attorney's fees must come
from the compensatory award; thus, the winning plaintiff never ob-
tains full compensation. 466 Insolvent plaintiffs can obtain partial re-
covery of fees under rule 82 when they are successful. Successful
defendants, however, are unable to collect their fees from insolvent
plaintiffs. This result, in effect, creates a one-way shift in favor of
insolvent plaintiffs.
There have been complaints that defendants' offers of judgment
under rule 68 put considerable pressure on plaintiffs to settle for
reduced amounts. 467 This additional pressure on already risk-
averse plaintiffs is similar to that experienced under the English
practice of "payment in."' 468 The major problem with rule 82 prac-
tice in Alaska, however, is with the fee awards made to the successful
defendants. Defendants are not limited by any fee schedule but only
by the court's discretion.4 69 These awards can range from twenty
percent to eighty percent of the actual defense fees.470 Such awards
amount to a great deal of money, and they result in a great deal of
risk aversion for plaintiffs with assets.
Two recent cases concerning attorney's fees have caused a great
deal of controversy in Alaska. In Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil
462. See Interview with Hensley, supra note 461; Interview with Parrish, supra note 461;
Interview with Sanders, supra note 461.
463. See Interview with Hensley, supra note 461; Interview with Parrish, supra note 461;
Interview with Sanders, supra note 461.
464. James A. Parrish, The Alaska Rules Are a Success, Plainti/s View,JUDGES J., Spring 1985,
at 8, 53; see ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(1) (limiting award of attorney's fees to 10% of award in
contested matters where award exceeds $75,000).
465. See Parrish, supra note 464, at 53 (explaining that limiting recovery of fees to 10% of
award under rule 82 only covers approximately one-third of fees owed to attorney, which are
often 33% of award).
466. But see Parrish, supra note 464, at 53 (noting that plaintiffs who receive large awards
occasionally do not suffer net loss because large damages awards cover attorney's fees not
recovered from losing party).
467. See ALASK.A R. Civ. P. 68(b)(1) (stating that prevailing party who rejects offer of settle-
ment must pay attorney's fees and costs incurred after best offer of settlement if the offer of
settlement was greater than the actual judgment); AndrewJ. Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser
Pays the Winner's Fees, JUDGESJ., Spring 1985, at 4, 6-7 (explaining that if after rejecting settle-
ment offer, plaintiff obtains award in amount less than settlement, then defendant is entitled
to award of attorney's fees incurred subsequent to settlement offer under Alaska's rule 68).
468. See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text (discussing "payment in" system).
469. See Hughes, supra note 58, at 147-52 (discussing evolution of discretion under rule
82).
470. See Kleinfeld, supra note 467, at 6 (stating that as procedural matter awards cannot be
reversed).
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Co. ,471 the plaintiff, a pilot, was fired after refusing to take a random
drug test.472 The plaintiff sued Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) claiming
that he was dismissed in retaliation for whistleblowing. 473 The
plaintiff lost at trial, and ARCO submitted a request for seventy per-
cent of the $156,425 attorney's fees incurred during its defense.474
The court awarded fifty percent of the fees, $76,000, and an addi-
tional $14,600 in costs.475 The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the
award to ARCO,476 but two justices dissented. Justice Compton's
dissenting opinion focused on the discouraging effect that large at-
torney fee awards have on citizens' constitutional right of access to
the courts. 477 Justice Compton argued that the weight of the bur-
den imposed on a losing litigant by the award of attorney's fees
must be considered in light of the litigant's constitutional right of
access. 478 Justice Compton also noted the fear expressed in other
Alaska decisions that "the size of a party's bank account will have a
major impact on his access to the courts. '479
In Van Huff v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co. ,4s0 the plaintiff brought a
wrongful termination action against his employer, SOHIO.48 1 After
the plaintiff lost at trial, SOHIO submitted a request for sixty per-
cent of attorney's fees and costs of $351,854.482 The trial judge
awarded $117,251, or thirty percent of defendant's legal fees.4 3
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the fee award was excessive and
that it effectively deprived him of his constitutional right of access to
the courts. 48 4  The Alaska Supreme Court rejected these
arguments. 485
471. 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992).
472. Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 2-3 (Alaska 1992).
473. See id. at 3 (stating that plaintiff complained about problems with safety in ARCO's
aviation branch on several occasions).
474. See id. (stating that plaintiff was collaterally estopped by findings of employment
board hearing from contesting facts surrounding termination, and that thus there was absence
of material facts to litigate).
475. Id-
476. Id.
477. See id. at 5-6 (Compton, J., dissenting) (refusing to reach constitutional issue but
noting its relevance to determination of reasonable fee award by trial court).
478. See id. at 6 (refusing to adopt strict guideline for trial court to use in determining
whether award of attorney's fees is reasonable).
479. Id. at 5.
480. 835 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1992).
481. See Van Huff v. SOHIO Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Alaska 1992) (stating
that plaintiff believed that he was fired because of supervisor's malice and ill will, but that
Alaska Petroleum claimed plaintiff was "marginal" employee released during normal
downsizing).
482. See id. at 1184 (adding that plaintiff argued that SOHIO was seeking reimbursement
for unnecessary work).
483. Id.
484. Id. at 1188-89.
485. Id.
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Although the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the attorney's fees
award to SOHIO, Justices Matthews and Compton dissented as they
had in Bozarth.48 6 As a result of the concern expressed in the dis-
senting opinions in Bozarth and Van Huff, the Alaska Supreme Court
issued an order repealing rule 82 and reenacting a revised rule
82.487 The "new" rule 82 limits fees recoverable by defendants to
thirty percent of actual attorney's fees after trial and twenty percent
if the litigation concluded without a trial.488 Of special interest is
the rule's provision that permits the trial court to vary such awards
at its discretion. Under sections (I) and (J), new rule 82 allows
courts to consider, among other factors, the following:
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the
non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants
from the voluntary use of the courts;
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party
suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart
from the case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by
others against the prevailing party or its insurer .... 489
D. Economics
For the last twenty years, economic theory has exerted a great in-
fluence on the legal academic community.490 Law schools devote a
variety of courses to the subject, and law reviews focusing on eco-
nomic issues proliferate. Law and economics theory provides a vari-
ety and richness of theoretical material that benefits the legal
community.
Law and economics scholars have not ignored the fee-shifting de-
bate. A great deal of economic theoretical work based on elaborate
mathematical models has been devoted to the examination of fee-
shifting systems. 49 1 As a tool for predicting litigants' behavior or
486. See id. at 1189 (Compton, J., dissenting) (citing rationale expressed in Bozarth
dissent).
487. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82 (amended by Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1118, effective
July 15, 1993).
488. The "new" rule 82, effectiveJuly'15, 1993, states:
(2) In cases in which the prevailing party recovers no money judgment, the court
shall award the prevailing party in a case which goes to trial 30 percent of the prevail-
ing party's actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred, and shall award the
prevailing party in a case resolved without trial 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees
which were necessarily incurred. The actual fees shall include fees for legal work
customarily performed by an attorney but which was delegated to and performed by
an investigator, paralegal or law clerk.
ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(a)(2).
489. L
490. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 993, 994 (1990) (discussing law and economics movement during 1970s and 1980s).
491. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
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the propriety of a particular fee-shifting rule for a legal system, how-
ever, economic theory has severe limitations. For example, Judge
Richard Posner first postulated that the English Rule would lead
risk-averse plaintiffs to settle more cases than they would under the
American Rule.49 2 Judge Posner and Professor Stephen Shavell
subsequently developed a theoretical mathematical model that
demonstrated that the English Rule would lead to fewer settlements
than the American Rule.493 A recent article by a law and economics
scholar argues, however, that all past theoretical economic evalua-
tions of the effects of fee-shifting rules on settlements are flawed
because they ignore a basic economic theorem.49
4
The allegedly flawed analysis of law and economics scholars is not
the only problem. The ability of economists to place an economic
value on anything is doubtful. It seems appropriate for a tangible
item, such as property, to be the subject of economic evaluation,
such as the cost-benefit analysis of tort law. Economists experience
a great deal of consternation, however, in trying to place economic
or monetary values on intangible items, such as human life and well-
being.495 Economists' valuation of a human life may range from
$175,000 to $3,200,000.496 It is not the inability to arrive at a single
Their Resolution, 27 J. EcoN. LrrERATURE 1067, 1073 (1989) (considering effect of allocating
legal costs on decision to pursue trial);John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement and Litigation, or I'll
Be Suing You, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 158 (1989) (finding that English Rule will produce more
settlements, but that cases that do not settle will be zealously litigated); Avery Katz, Measuring
the Demandfor Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987)
(concluding that English Rule increases litigation costs); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Legal Procedure andJudicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 428-29 (1973) [herein-
after Posner, Economic Approach] (contending that English Rule encourages settlement and
rewards parties who correctly predict outcome of litigation); Richard A. Posner, Comment on
Donohue, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 927, 928 (1988) [hereinafter Posner, Comment] (arguing that
English Rule would produce fewer settlements); Stephen Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Triak A
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55,
56-69 (1982) (considering four ways of allocating trial costs); Smith, supra note 421, at 2157
(investigating effect of American Rule, English Rule, and revised English Rule developed by
President's Counsel on Competitiveness, on frequency of settlements).
492. See Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 491, at 428 (finding that English Rule would
increase settlements because it would magnify litigants' risk aversion).
493. See Posner, Comment, supra note 491, at 928 (concluding that English Rule will de-
crease number of settlements because parties expecting to win will not avoid costs of litiga-
tion); Shavell, supra note 491, at 65 (finding that there will be fewer settlements under English
Rule where parties expect equal judgments).
494. See Donohue, supra note 229, at 1096-1109 (arguing that under Coase economic the-
orem, parties will contract around existing legal standard to increase wealth, regardless of
rule applied).
495. See Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages:
A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 152 n.92 (1982) (explaining that valuing human life is
affront toJudeo-Christian beliefs held by much of American public); Marianne Lavelle, Placing
a Price on Human Life: A Legal Puzzle, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 10, 1988, at 1, 1 (discussing difficulty of
governmental agencies in assigning value to human life for use in regulatory cost-benefit
analyses).
496. Andreas Teuber, Justifying Risk, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at 242 (noting that because
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figure that is most disturbing; rather, it is "a coarseness and gross-
ness of moral feeling, a blunting of sensibility, and a suppression of
individual discrimination and gentleness. ' 497 The cold-blooded
cost-benefit analysis that Ford made in the famous Ford Pinto
case 498 was severely sanctioned by the jury, a sanction that reflected
society's rejection of such economic evaluations. 499
Society seems willing to accept a considerable amount of cost-inef-
fectiveness when it comes to human values. 500 Free speech, due pro-
cess, and human welfare can be considered "unmarketed goods"
that are not valued in analysis of economic welfare, but that are
highly valued for their enhancement of societal welfare. 5°)' A central
purpose of tort law is to provide a system for redress of social griev-
ance. 50 2 This system may prove economically wasteful, but it may
still be accepted for its enhancement of human welfare. 50 3
Economic analysis of fee-shifting systems presumes that people
always react in an economically efficient manner.50 4 The core of any
economic analysis is the measurement of "economic costs" and
"economic benefits." 50 5 Nevertheless, public policy decisions about
any issue, including fee shifting, cannot be based solely on the cost-
benefit analysis of economics. In an analysis of attitudes towards
risks, Professor Teuber describes the inadequacies of the cost-bene-
fit analysis:
Because it fails to respect the distinctiveness of people's responses
to risks, or to do justice to the morally significant ways in which
market does not assign value for life, value is often determined by price that people pay for
safety); Lavelle, supra note 495, at 1 (placing value of human life at $1,950,000, plus or minus
$500,000).
497. Teuber, supra note 496, at 242 (quoting philosopher Stuart Hampshire).
498. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing Ford's analysis of costs and benefits of remedying design defect that made Pinto
automobile prone to explode on sufficient impact).
499. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 206-13 (1988) (discuss-
ing law and economics-oriented explanations for Ford's action, and criticizing Ford for failure
to develop safer design at same price); Schwartz, supra note 495, at 149-53 (discussing jury's
rationale behind imposition of punitive damages on Ford).
500. Cf Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political Systems, 70 TEx. L. REv.
645, 658-68 (1992) (explaining that redistributive activities aimed at increasing social welfare
are economically wasteful).
501. See id at 648-59 (explaining that these "goods" are not valued in economic analysis
because they are not easily "monetized," but that these goods have value to lawyers, who
create and defend rights).
502. See id at 660 (asserting that litigation fosters social welfare).
503. See id at 659-60 (arguing that activities aimed at creating utility increase social wel-
fare, enhance long-range economic efficiency, and promote political stability).
504. See generally supra note 491 and accompanying text (discussing economic analysis of
fee-shifting rules).
505. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-3 (1960)
(using cost-benefit analysis to establish framework for allocating property rights and liability).
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risks can be distributed, or to give proper weight to the impor-
tance we attach to human life in situations of felt urgency, or to
capture the special significance of our concern for autonomy and
rights, cost-benefit analysis cannot yield the same result as indi-
vidual consent. For these reasons we should not be persuaded to
allow cost-benefit analysis to determine public policy-to do, as it
were, our talking for us. 50 6
E. The One- Way Shift
As previously described, there are over 2000 statutes in the
United States that provide for shifting of attorney's fees between
litigants. 50 7 This number can give the misleading appearance that
the American Rule is losing popular support and is gradually being
rejected in the United States. The vast majority of fee-shifting stat-
utes in the United States, however, only provide for one-way shifts
in favor of plaintiffs. 508 Legislatures have long recognized that the
value of the added incentive created by such statutes, beyond that
provided by the American Rule, is that it induces private plaintiffs to
enforce statutory objectives. 50 9 Thus, the large number of fee-shift-
ing statutes in the United States reflects neither criticism of the
American Rule nor favor for the English Rule; instead, it reflects a
desire to provide additional access to the courts. Legislatures that
intend to encourage private enforcement of statutes never select the
English Rule.510
One-way shifts favoring plaintiffs have also developed within two-
way shift systems as a means of overcoming plaintiffs' risk aversion
and providing access to justice. When an insolvent plaintiff brings
an action under the English Rule, the system allows for a one-way
shift in the plaintiff's favor. 511 This system is the practice followed
in England, Australia, Alaska, and, formerly, in Florida medical
cases.
5 12
506. Teuber, supra note 496, at 247.
507. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (stating that nearly 2000 state statutes
and 200 federal statutes shift attorney's fees).
508. See supra note 209 (citing studies that demonstrate that fee shifting favors plaintiffs).
509. See Mause, supra note 15, at 38-42 (discussing use of fee shifting to encourage public
interest litigation); Percival & Miller, supra note 209, at 239-41 (explaining that fee-shifting
statutes encourage litigation in public interest by reducing potential costs of litigation); Rowe,
Legal Theory, supra note 15, at 662-63 (discussing use of fee shifting to promote action by
private attorneys general).
510. See Percival & Miller, supra note 209, at 240 & n.45 (explaining that Congress only
allows for one-way fee shifting because it is invariably attempting to encourage plaintiffs to
assert rights under federal statutes).
511. See supra note 353 and accompanying text (discussing operation of English Rule).
512. See supra notes 343-53 and accompanying text (explaining that in England, legal aid
frees qualifying plaintiffs from paying costs of litigation, win or loose); supra notes 401-08 and
accompanying text (explaining that in Australia indigent plaintiffs lacking assets, but possess-
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VI. A REEXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
AMERICAN RULE
Some justifications advanced by supporters of the English Rule
have either gone unanswered or been accepted as gospel. A reex-
amination of these justifications seems appropriate at this point.
A. Compensation
English Rule advocates point to the obvious: a party who recoups
attorney's fees in a two-way shift receives more than a party operat-
ing under a nonshifting rule.518 From this simple fact, proponents
conclude that the English Rule is more fair because it provides full
compensation to a successful party.514 Both the conclusion and its
basis deserve closer scrutiny.
Under the English Rule, only winners receive full compensation.
The rule operates to make a successful plaintiff whole. The propo-
nents then assume that all winning plaintiffs will receive full com-
pensation and that all winning defendants will be made whole under
a two-way system. It is at this juncture that the hypothetical col-
lapses because it ignores the realities of the system. As evidenced in
England, the injured person, as a "one shot player," is pitted against
a more powerful "repeat player."5 15
The hypothetical justification ignores the multitude of hazards,
such as risk aversion, confronting an injured party. In the "practi-
cal" application of a two-way shift system, the injured party seldom
receives full compensation while the defendant is almost always
"overcompensated." Thus, injured people obtain full compensa-
tion in theory but not in practice.
B. Small Claims
Similarly tenuous assumptions also underlie the purported bene-
fit that the two-way shift bestows on small claimants. First, it is as-
sumed that the small claimant is able to obtain legal services without
immediate payment because an attorney is willing to forego immedi-
ate payment of fees in the hopes of recovering them from the
ing serious injury and strong case, will benefit from one-way shift where case is accepted on
"spec"); supra notes 463-66 and accompanying text (explaining one-way shift in favor of plain-
tiffs under Alaskan fee-shifting rule); supra notes 444-45 and accompanying text (discussing
one-way shift under Florida statute).
513. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing compensation).
514. See Mause, supra note 15, at 28-30 (examining argument that awarding attorney's fees
promotes justice by providing for recompensation); Rowe, Legal Theory, supra note 15, at 657-
59 (discussing and criticizing compensation rationale for fee shifting).
515. See supra notes 303-17 and accompanying text (discussing characterization of
parties).
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wrongdoer. 516 The real world, however, operates otherwise. Solici-
tors demand payment of incurred fees from the small claimant for
several reasons. The English ethical code prevents a solicitor from
guaranteeing that he or she will charge no fee.5 17 Although English
and Australian solicitors have developed an alternative method of
taking cases on spec, they will generally refuse to offer this alterna-
tive for small claims because the fees recoverable in such instances
are so limited. 51 8
Even assuming that a small claimant decides to pay fees as they
are incurred because the claim is very strong and the amounts re-
coverable in attorney's fees are limited, the difference between fees
recoverable and those paid soon exceeds the value of the claim.
Thus, the assertion that the small claimant benefits from the two-
way shift is true only in exceptional circumstances. Perhaps the
small claimant's best method of avoiding immediate payment of
legal fees is through legal aid or small claims courts because access
to private attorney services does not appear viable, at least not in
Australia and England. Empirical studies are needed to determine
whether the English Rule actually benefits small claimants.
C. Court Congestion
The English Rule is offered as a cure for courts allegedly over-
crowded with nonmeritorious claims and defenses. 51 9 These asser-
tions each require close scrutiny. U.S. courts are overcrowded;
however, there is absolutely no empirical data from any source that
indicates that the overcrowding is caused by nonmeritorious actions
or defenses. To the contrary, evidence indicates that courts are
overcrowded because they are inundated with criminal cases and are
severely underfunded. In February 1992, the American Bar Associ-
ation reported that both federal and state courts were severely
handicapped by a lack of funds. 520 At the same time, an "exponen-
516. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text (discussing small claims).
517. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (explaining that judge may deny award of
attorney's fees to prevailing party upon learning that fees were not paid as incurred).
518. See supra note 396 and accompanying text (discussing "spec" arrangements).
519. See Mause, supra note 15, at 34-35 (criticizing argument that indemnity system would
relieve court congestion because it fails to consider that indemnity system could increase liti-
gation); supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (discussing argument that English Rule is
preferable to American Rule because American Rule fails to discourage plaintiffs from bring-
ing frivolous claims); cf Rowe, Legal Theory, supra note 15, at 660-61 (discussing fee shifting as
means to stop abuses of legal system).
520. See REPORT OF THE ABA WORKING GROUP ON CIVILJUSTICE SYSTEM PROPOSALS, ABA
BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVILJUSTICE SYSTEM at 5-6, 46-48 (1992) [hereinafter ABA
BLUEPRINT] (commenting that caseloads are unmanageable, courts are understaffed and
poorly equipped, and adding that dramatic increase in number of criminal cases continues to
siphon remaining resources committed to civil justice system).
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tial increase in criminal filings precipitated by the war on drugs" has
overwhelmed the courts. 521 Due to the speedy-trial requirements of
the criminal justice system, already overburdened criminal courts
have borrowed resources from the civil courts. 522 This increase in
the number of criminal cases has created a crisis in a civil justice
system that was already starved for resources. 523 Overcrowding of
the courts results from policy decisions to increase criminal prose-
cutions without providing proper funding. The government, not
the private plaintiff, is responsible for the overcrowding of civil
courts.
Examined as an issue separate from overcrowded courts, the non-
meritorious claims and defenses assertion itself reveals several
shortcomings. The assertion provides no adequate definition of
what constitutes a frivolous claim or an abusive defense. In addi-
tion, there is no reliable data concerning the extent of such prac-
tices. These problems undermine the use of frivolous claims as a
rationale for applying the English Rule because that rule offers a
cure for a problem that has not been proven to exist.
The English Rule is alleged to have almost mystical curative pow-
ers to deter nonmeritorious claims or defenses while simultaneously
promoting meritorious ones because unfounded claims or defenses
will result in payment of the opponent's attorney's fees. 524 The
American Rule is said to lack such deterrence;5 25 ergo, the English
Rule is superior. This "logical" argument assumes that the abusing
party would recognize the frivolous nature of its claim or defense
prior to the outcome of litigation. Many claims and defenses are
asserted by parties based on a good-faith belief in their validity.
Thus, any rationale that would automatically label a losing litigant's
claim or defense as frivolous goes too far.526 If frivolousness were
to be determined by a factor other than the parties' loss of the case,
521. See S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6800,
6804 (recognizing relationship between scarcity of resources in civil justice system and heavily
drug-related caseloads); ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 520, at 5-6, 46-47 (discussing negative
impact of tripling of drug-related criminal cases and stricter mandatory sentencing provisions
on civil justice system in past decade);JoHN GOERDT, EXAMINING COURT DELAY 97-103 (1987)
(recognizing sharp increase in number of drug-related cases and examining relationship be-
tween management of civil and criminal cases).
522. ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 520, at 48.
523. See ABA BLUEPRINT, supra note 520, at 48 (stating that crisis has manifested itself
through budget cuts, delays, reduced hours of operation for courts, and closing of courts).
524. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (presenting arguments that English
Rule will produce more equitable settlements and relieve court congestion).
525. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (highlighting arguments that American
Rule tacitly fosters frivolous suits by failing to require unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay defend-
ant's costs).
526. See Mause, supra note 15, at 28-32 (arguing that predictability of outcome should be
key to determining whether claim or defense was reasonable); cf Rowe, Legal Theory, supra
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it would require objective measurement by someone other than the
parties.527 Assuming that a judge would determine the issue, the
end result would be so similar to the standard applied under our
bad faith rule that use of the English Rule would merely be redun-
dant.528 When a frivolous claim or defense is determined by the
outcome of litigation, the English Rule both compensates and pun-
ishes. It compensates the winner and punishes the loser. Although
English case law denies that the cost-shifting rule is premised on
punishment,529 a few authors believe otherwise.530
D. Severely Injured Indigents
One possible "benefit" available under the English Rule, and one
that is not mentioned by most two-way shift advocates, is the ability
to improve the position of severely injured indigents. A solicitor
may take such a case on spec.53 1 When this arrangement occurs, the
two-way shift is converted into a one-way shift in favor of the plain-
tiff.532 If the plaintiff is successful, both attorney's fees and compen-
satory damages are recoverable; however, nothing is recoverable
from the losing indigent.533 Thus, under both the English Rule and
the American Rule, insolvent plaintiffs are not obligated to immedi-
ately pay their attorney's fees.
In England, the insolvent plaintiff who is not on legal aid may be
obligated to pay for other legal expenses incurred before judg-
ment.53 4 The American Rule affords greater relief on this factor,
note 15, at 654-57 (arguing that issue of fee award is not adequately resolved by judgment on
merits).
527. Cf Mause, supra note 15, at 29, 46-50 (proposing that case-by-case review of reasona-
bleness of losing litigant's claims or defenses would be burdensome because standards would
be difficult to define).
528. See generally Joan Chipser, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HAs-
TINGS Li. 319, 319-31 (1977) (comparing American Rule, English Rule, and federal bad faith
standard).
529. See Clarke v. Hart, 10 Eng. Rep. 1443, 1457 (H.L. 1858) (stating that imposition of
costs on losing party is not punishment but is merely consequence of bringing failed action);
Neil Gold, Controlling Procedural Abuses: The Role of Costs and Inherent Judicial Authority, 9 OtrAWA
L. REv. 44, 53 (1977) (postulating that courts have denied punishment as rationale for rule
because punishment is for criminal cases).
530. See Corboy, supra note 411, at 31 (arguing that English Rule is not concerned with
benefiting plaintiff, but rather with sanctioning losing party); Gold, supra note 529, at 53 (ar-
guing that award of attorney's fees serves as penalty as well as deterrent).
531. See supra note 337 and accompanying text (discussing private financing in England).
532. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text (discussing cost allocation in British
legal aid system).
533. See supra note 353 and accompanying text (explaining that party qualifying for legal
aid is not required to pay costs, regardless of outcome of case).
534. See supra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing private financing of claims in
England).
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however, because the attorney will advance the expenses.53 5 In Aus-
tralia, the solicitor's practice of advancing expenses or cosigning
loans with indigent clients places the Australian plaintiff on an equal
plane with an American counterpart. 53 6 In the event of a loss, the
English plaintiff would be in the worst position as to payment of fees
and expenses, while the Australian and American plaintiffs would be
in equally advantageous positions. If the plaintiff wins, it would
seem logical that both the English and Australian plaintiffs would
receive more than the American plaintiff. This conclusion, however,
might not be true. The overall "hard bargaining" practice under
the English system appears to reduce both the probability and fre-
quency of success for plaintiffs. For example, ProfessorJohn Flem-
ing stated that, by 1985, the highest reputed English award for
personal injury was only £75,000.537 Only new data derived from
sound empirical studies can resolve whether or not an indigent
plaintiff receives more benefits from a one-way shift under the Eng-
lish system than under the American Rule.
VII. THE RATIONALE FOR THE AMERICAN RULE: ACCESS TO
JUSTICE
The American Rule has been characterized as an "historical acci-
dent." 53 8 Although this characterization has been disproved,53 9
there is little historical information about the policies of the Ameri-
can Rule. In the nineteenth century, payment of attorney's fees by
the client rather than through recovery from a defeated opponent
seemed so natural that no justification appeared necessary. The
modern view of the policy indulging the rule has been expressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court:
[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized
for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor
might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindi-
cate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
535. See supra notes 411-22 and accompanying text (discussing contingent fee system in
United States).
536. See supra notes 402-08 and accompanying text (discussing indigent plaintiffs in
Australia).
537. JoHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 566 n.31 (7th ed. 1987).
538. See Ehrenzweig, Counsel Fees, supra note 210, at 113-14 (arguing that American Rule is
result of accident and not of moral judgment regarding restraint of winner); Ehrenzweig, Re-
imbursement, supra note 15, at 798-99 (arguing that American Rule resulted from New York
Legislature's attempt to perpetuate English Rule by using fixed amounts rather than
percentages).
539. See Luebsdorf, supra note 27, at 10 (arguing that colonial legislature was aware that
award of attorney's fees was small in comparison to actual fees, and that legislature deliber-
ately refused to raise set amounts for awards).
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opponents' counsel .... Also, the time, expense, and difficulties
of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes rea-
sonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens forjudicial
administration.540
These reasons seem to reflect the earlier beliefs about American
democracy and individualism. This reverence for the individual and
the belief that litigation was a "fair fight" precluded placing any
penalties on a losing party.541 Litigation of basic rights was not to
be discouraged by rules that denied access to the courts. These be-
liefs in American democracy are reflected by the modern views on
access to justice.
CONCLUSION
Past arguments criticizing the American Rule and urging whole-
sale importation of the English Rule of fee shifting as a cure for a
multitude of perceived ills in the American judicial system do not
provide sufficient information on which to base an effective analysis
of the English Rule's benefits and detriments. Such arguments
present an incomplete picture because they are premised on a gen-
eralized theory that assumes that the goals of the English Rule are
met by the reality of its operation. These arguments further fail to
consider the operational effects of the rule in the context of con-
cerns about access to justice and risk aversion.
Recent studies only begin to supply the information needed for
more cogent analysis of the benefits and detriments of both rules.
More study is needed. The information that does exist casts strong
doubt on the English Rule's ability to effect the goals of full com-
pensation for the successful litigant and greater access for small
claimants. In general, the English Rule operates as a greater imped-
iment to access to justice than does the American Rule. A fee-shift-
ing rule that operates as a one-way shift in favor of injured plaintiffs
affords the greatest access to justice.542 Its effectiveness in reaching
this goal is modified, however, by the system within which it
operates.
Because the studies to date cast doubt on the English Rule's abil-
ity to meet the purported goals offered to justify its application in
540. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
541. See Monroe, supra note 15, at 152-54 (explaining that outcome of litigation was be-
lieved to be equally dependent on merits and initiative of parties).
542. A one-way shift in favor of plaintiffs has been suggested. See Hicks, supra note 15, at
782-800 (arguing for one-way shift for tort plaintiffs, but limiting plaintiffs' recovery by elimi-
nating portion of plaintiffs' damages in exchange for one-way shift); Monroe, supra note 15, at
167-72 (setting forth model statute to effect one-way shift in favor of financially disadvantaged
plaintiffs).
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the United States, much more needs to be done before we import
the rule as a "cure" for perceived ills. If the primary intent is to
reduce access to courts and to reduce the number of claims regard-
less of merit, then the English Rule would appear to operate effec-
tively. If, however, the intent is to provide full compensation to the
successful litigant and to provide greater access for the small claim-
ant, the English Rule does not appear to operate effectively.
